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The subject of this work is the strategic problems faced by the 
United States 1\Iavy in the Western Pacific following the acquisition of 
the Philippine Islands as a result of the Spanish-American War. Using 
primary rraterials from the National Archives, 1\Iaval War College, and 
Library of Congress Manuscript Division, some of which have only 
recently been declassified, the rarely publicized 'WOrks of the United 
States Navy in regards to strategic planning and national interests are 
,~ 
2 
detailed. Secondary accounts, along with contemporary periodical 
literature, supplement the previously classified doctnl1ents. 
Of particular use were the extensive records of the General Board 
found in the Archives, as well as in the Naval College, that repeatedly 
stressed the problems of defending the newly acquired territories in 
the Western Pacific without adequate facilities, a handicap that would 
continue throughout the period in question. A lack of support reduced 
mission capabilities. Any deployment of naval forces fran haue waters 
to the Philippines, a distance of over 7,000 miles, rreant that upon 
arrival those forces would require extensive replenishment, re-supply, 
and quite possibly damage repairs. 
The challenge faced by the U. S. Navy during the period of 
1898-1922 was: How would it carry out an undefined national policy 
related to defending American territory in the Far East? The nation as 
a whole never attempted to define the role of the . I . navy vis-a-vis the 
defense of American interests in the Western Pacific, instead dealing 
with errerging contingencies. Naval planners routinely pointed out that 
a lack of a definite policy hamstrung the navy as they could never be 
sure that planning studies and ship building programs would be 
supported by the nation. 
The previously unavailable material thoroughly refutes the oft 
repeated claim that Theodore Roosevelt, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Henry 
Cabot Lodge conspired to lead the United States into war with Spain, so 
as to acquire territory and naval bases. Declassified papers document 
the evolution of naval planning in preparation for a "possible" war, 
well before Roosevelt's tenure as Assistant Secretary of Navy. 
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THE NEED FOR NAVAL BASES 
The recent turmoil surrounding the unsettled political situation 
in the Philippine Islands has, in a strategic sense, threatened the 
United States with the potential loss~rher ability to protect our 
national interests in the Western Pacific. The deprivation of naval 
facilities at SUbic Bay and Cubi Point would force the withdrawal of 
American naval forces to either our most distant facility in the 
region, Guam, or, in a worse case scenario, Hawaii. Such a retirement 
eastward would concurrently bring with it a reduction in the ability of 
the United States to project its military po~r in the Western Pacific. 
This inability to project power in order to defend national interests, 
whether poli tica 1 or economic, is not one of a recent origin in 
American history. At this manent the United States has possession of 
or access to the following major naval support facilities in the 
\ \ 
Western Pacific: (1) Guam, (2) Subic Bay and Cubi Point in the 
Philippines, and (3) Yokosuka and Sasebo in Japan. Additional limited 
facilities are available in Singapore and American Samoa. Prior to 
1899 The United States Navy had no overseas bases or facilities and 
limited access to an American owned coal depot in Yokohama, Japan and 
docking privileges in Hong Kong . 1 
2 
Other than a desire for access to Asian markets, the United States 
had slight interest in the Western Pacific before the 1890's. During 
that decade, hONever, the military planning philosophies of Alfred 
Thayer Mahan, in conjunction with the threatened partition of China by 
the major European pONers, forced the United States to reconsider her 
western hemispheric concerns in favor of protecting its long tenn 
interests in the Western Pacific. There existed no broad policy 
planning or "conspiracy" to expand territorially into Asia, but a 
confluence of personalities and events led to an intimate Arrerican 
involvement thus necessitating the ability to respond and react to 
incidents in a tirnely manner. The U.S. Navy was able to carry out this 
mission in a limited sense, limited because it was only at the 
convenience of the major powers possessing support facilities in the 
region and who,at an inopportune moment could deny their use to 
\ 
American naval forces,as did actually occur after the beginning of the 
Spanish-American War,when both Japan and Britain refused access to the 
belligerents in compliance with international law. 
Canrrodore Dewey's startling victory at Manila Bay in 1898 
presented a major problem. Defeat of the Spanish required him to 
remain on "station" to protect his position amidst lack of any major 
support facilities. This situation, along with the influence of strong 
naval power adherents pushed the Nation into the realm of 
"Realpolitik". A large navy required facilities, both foreign and 
dornestic, to support wide-ranging camnitments and interests in the 
Western Pacific. Thus, the Philippines (and Guam) were considered 
ideal locations for protecting such interests. 
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The bulk of this work deals with the "Navy's attempts between 1898 
and 1921 to secure for itself the major support facilities it felt 
w::iuld be needed to sustain any missions overseas. The inability of the 
nation as a whole to spell out realistically a national policy and the 
Navy's role in it (beyond just responding to emergencies) rreant that 
eventually Naval planners would be left in frustration as to whether or 
not to push for their agenda, specifically, overseas naval bases, for 
in the late 1800's naval forces were the most effective and sorretimes 
only available method of advancing national interests. Three 
components are required to carry out successfully national policy and 
missions (national interests) 2 : National will, Congressional support 
and Executive direction. Rarely were those three in synchronization 
and thus, like an old three legged stool, planning suffered fran one 
imbalance or another. 
MAHAN, SEA POWER AND BASES 
Naval strategy and policy planning grew to be based on the 
expressions of Alfred Thayer Mahan and his pivotal work, The Influence 
of Sea POtJer upon History, 1660-1783, almost exclusively dealing with 
the historical and strategic success of the British Navy. 3 Using this 
platform M:lhan wanted his ONn nation to aspire to a more expanded role 
for itself in international affairs, a task requiring a large navy and 
support facilities to sustain its missions. It has to be noted that 
Mahan did not invent nor discover naval strategy, but he was one of the 
earliest historians to collate the lessons of Britain's success upon 
the sea and widely publicize them. His endeavor served to inspire 
others, with William E. Livezey noting: 
All in all, Mahan's facts were so freshly and powerfully 
presented against the background of naval history in its wider 
bearings and in such a popular nonprofessional style that both 
from the manner of treating and resulting creation of 
interest, he ~y rightly be called the father of naval 
historiography. 
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Most of Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power Upon History dealt with how 
Britain grew powerful by dominating corrmercial trade routes with her 
navy. As the subject of this work deals prirra.rily with naval bases, we 
should examine sane of the views that Mahan espoused, as they applied 
to the Pacific. 5 
Though most of the advocates of the "Large Policy" (calling for a 
larger navy and a more involved international particip:ition by the 
United States) held that the Pacific Ocean was to be "the theatre of 
the great events of the coming century" and cognizant of "the beginning 
of manentous issues in China and Japan" their "vision reached not past 
Hawaii. 116 Mahan himself never advocated offensive action against the 
Philippines or acquisition of territory beyond Hawaii until after the 
Spanish-American War began, although he has been credited with such 
amb
. . 7 itions. His work on naval pONer dealt with how a nation flexed its 
forces overseas, indeed, how its effectiveness depended on strong bases 
and naval stations, particularly distant colonial points d'appui. He 
had recognized this as the strength of Britain's primacy on the v.10rld's 
sea-lanes, as ships sailing from and to England and points in between 
needed safe home ports to ensure that canrrercial shipping was 
protected. Mahan noted that colonies, and naval bases by extension, 
" ... facilitate and enlarge the operations of shipping and tend to 
5 
protect it by multiplying points of safety .... 118 Strong interconnected 
overseas stations allowed the Royal Navy to project power worldwide and 
with few exceptions controlled vital choke points that provided them 
effective control of the seas. Mahan saw this as "the maintenance of 
suitable naval stations in those distant parts of the world ... " which 
allowed the projection of naval power. Mahan's definition of command 
or control of the seas9 is also intertwined with the question of 
national policy, as he clearly recognized that the ultimate purpose of 
military and naval force is to enforce the will of the government, 
whether a democratic institution or a coercive regime: 
Before hostile armies or fleets are brought into contact (a 
word which better perhaps than any indicates the dividing line 
between tactics and strategy), there are a number of questions 
to be decided, covering the whole plan of operations 
throughout the theatre of war. Among these are the proper 
function of the navy in war; its true objective; the points 
or points upon which it should be concentrated; the 
establishment of depots of coal and supplies; the maintenance 
of corrmunications between these depots and the home base; the 
military value of comnerce-destroying as a decisive or a 
secondary operation of war; the system upon which 
canrrerce-destroying can be most efficiently conducted, whether 
by scattered cruisers or by holding in force some vital centre 
through_which cc;irrirrercial 0shipping must pass. All these are strategic questions .... 
The strategic questions not only required the three components of 
national policy previously discussed but also required a military and 
naval force prepared for contingencies and the necessary support 
facilities, whether training, repair, docking or supplies. Another 
facet was the distant stations that not only allcwed the nation control 
of the sea but permitted the interdiction of hostile or neutral 
shipping that could be a disadvantage to the . 11 nation. Even more 
importantly, and holding irrplications for the future, the theorist 
6 
noted, "The protection of such stations must depend uµ:m either direct 
military force ... or upon a surrounding friendly population. 1112 Mahan 
foresaw that failure to secure such a base against hostile forces \\Duld 
nullify its ability to support naval missions. Without a secure base 
warships would be unable to refuel, repair or even sortie, thus 
degrading fleets and national policy alike. Mahan, in 1890, felt that 
the United States would not likely acquire colonies as the social and 
political framework of the nation and population was not conducive to 
colonialism. By July, 1898, ho.vever, Mahan felt the time was ripe for 
America to acquire overseas territory and along with that, naval bases 
and stations. 13 
Mahan's influence on American Naval policy planners has to be 
rreasured in regard to the era. A Navy previously dwelling in the 
doldrums because of a lack of funding and national concern was now 
gro.ving with increasing naval po.ver and appropriations, and facing 
heightened international tensions (Britain arrl Venezuela, the question 
of the Samoan Islands, Japrn and Hawaii, the Sino-Japanese War, the 
CUban insurrection and the probable disintegration of China). 14 It was 
a military force looking for a direction and Mahan provided the 
compass. His Influence of Sea Power upon History volume convinced 
naval policy makers that a "large" navy \\Duld not only support national 
interest but also provided them with a raison d'etre: 
Fellow officers were "delighted" and "proud" of him. They 
congratulated him for having written an "admirable book" 
filled with "astonishing and convincing truths," and they 
thanked him for having aided them in crystallizing what before 
was "rather nebulp~s" in their minds regarding "the proper way 
to carry on war." 
7 
Civilian observers further noted that "the results of the inquiry are 
used ... for the benefit of the authors fellow citizens" and that Mahan 
had "the circumstances of his cwn country in view;.. . to rekindle in 
the hearts of his fellow-countrymen sane desire to contest the 
16 supremacy of the seas." 
Mahan wanted to awaken his country to the dangers of complacency 
and the possible losses to the United States if it failed to change its 
ways and recover from what was considered the "folly of false economy" 
and "the stupidity of non-preparedness" and "the impossibility of 
preparation on the spur of the manent. 1117 To connect Mahan to the 
imperialist movement is incorrect, because he did not see imperialism 
in itself a great adventure; rather the furtherance of the nation as a 
whole required that Arrerica "look outward", beyond continental 
barriers, to enhance, and sustain the nation as a powerful entity: 
The profound influence upon the wealth and strength of 
countries was clearly seen long before the true principles 
which governed its growth and prosperity were detected. To 
secure to one's own people a disproportionate share of such 
benefits , every effort was rrade to exclude others, either by 
peaceful legislative methods of monopoly or prohibitory 
regulations, or, when these failed, by direct violence. The 
clash of interests, the angry feelings roused by conflicting 
attanpts thus to appropriate the larger share, if not the 
whole, of the advantages of carrrnr~ce, and of distant unsettled 
camrercial regions, led to wars. 
Naval officers did not see irrperialism per se as an antidote for a less 
than respectable Navy, because while Mahan called for the nation to 
"aCXJuire suitable bases, enlarge its merchant marine, complete the 
proposed Isthmian [Panama] Canal" and to build an "adequate Navy" their 
primary interest was on the last itan, basically, what should the Navy 
d . h' 11 . 19 o in t is overa srenar10? 
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IMPACT ON FOREIGN NAVIES 
Mahan' s influence of American naval planners was as strong on 
foreign navies and world opinion. v~ile his work was prirna.rily devoted 
to British hegemony at sea and designed to influence dorrestic policy, 
the translation of The Influence of Sea Power UJX?n History into many 
languages spread the Mahan gospel far and wide. The volume was 
rendered into French, German, Jap:i.nese, Russian, Italian and Sp:i.nish, 
as well as English, and went through fifteen editions between 1890 and 
1898. 20 Drawing praise from all corners of the world for his "adept 
handling of the tangled thread of causation and his substantiated 
evidence" of the importance of sea pa.ver, many governments used the 
philosophy to begin strengthening their navies and to justify the 
advancement of their own national interests, whether in close proximity 
he d . . 21 or t istant overseas regions. Mahan cannot be held accountable 
for the many uses of his work by policy planners, foreign and dorrestic, 
and although many try to blaID2 him for the rise of imperialism in the 
1890's, for the most part he only wrote and preached strategy, he did 
not create a widespread moverrent. Mahan did not lead the imperialist 
forces nor did he authorize or legislate any such action, because he 
was an influential naval officer not a politician. 22 No one was under 
any obligation to accept or believe his philosophy, but that does not 
negate his widespread effect on other powerful and responsible leaders, 
23 here and abrrad. 
As the subject of this work deals prirrarily with the problem faced 
by the United States Navy in regard to the unsettled situation of the 
9 
naval tase question in the Western Pacific, a look at the German, 
Jap:mese and British navies in regard to Mahan 's effect is in order. 
Since Germany was considered a potential military opponent as early as 
1897 in the Pacific (and would be until 1905), an overview provides a 
good example of Mahan's influence. Prior to 1897, Germany, under 
William II, longed for a navy strong enough to challenge Britain's so 
as to achieve the same accomplishrrents in the international realm. In 
the late 1880's German influence and paver had spread to the Central 
Pacific with trading firms in the fore providing a foothold leading to 
the eventual annexation of the Marshall Islands and challenging Spanish 
claims to the Caroline Islands. 24 William E. Livezey noted: 
The Gerrnan Colonial Off ice threw their support behind 
acquisitions and enlarged naval appropriations. There can be 
no doubt but that German trade interests and increased 
dependence on overseas food suppliez5definitely contributed to German Naval and Colonial policies. 
By 1897 the German Admiralty, under the strong leadership of 
Minister of Marine, Alfred von Tirpitz, and the German nation were 
ready to involve themselves in international politics (and in fact had 
already done so in 1895, in an incident related below), using sea power 
with Mahan as a guide and overseas acquisitions, something that the 
Kaiser referred to as "maritime fulcra" upon which the German Empire 
could assert itself in the expected Great Pov.er competition. 26 Germany 
did not want to be left out of the Great Power race: 
In the last century we were too late to partake of the general 
partition [Asia, South America and Africa]. But a second 
partition is forthcoming. We need only consider the 
isolation of China, that new India of the Far East, the 
unstable condition of South American states to see what rich 
opportunities await us. In order not to miss them this time 
we require a fleet. We must be so strong at sea that no 
nation which feels itself safe from our military [land] power 
may dare to overlook u2 7in partition negotiations, and there is no time to be lost. 
10 
The author was a captain on the German Grand General Staff doing a 
study of national power, and his views represented the essence of 
"Realpolitik" for in that short quote he captured the definition of not 
only sea power but the question of projection of power in which a 
nation utilizes superior assets to achieve national interests. Germany 
had coalesced as a nation far too late to :r;:artake of the imperialist 
triumphs of the 1600, 1700 and 1800's, thus using sea power the German 
nation could align with and influence events that served to benefit the 
nation as a whole, with the rewards to be gained later. As an example, 
in April, 1895, Germany along with France and Russia partici:r;:ated in 
what is carnnonly called the "Tri:r;:artite Intervention" and forced Ja:r;:an 
to return the Liaotung Peninsula, which China had relinquished as part 
of the Treaty of Shirnonoseki following her defeat in the 1894-1895 
Sino-Japanese war. The peninsula held one of the more strategic 
harbors (Port Arthur) in the area and the Europeans used the excuse 
that China's territorial integrity would be threatened by Ja:r;:an control 
of Port Arthur and would be a perpetual obstacle to peace, using the 
diplanatic language of the day that conveying the message that 
hostilities were deemed possible if the appropriate response was not 
provided. Ja:r;:an attempted to gain allies to counter the pressure by 
requesting American and British support but neither was prepared to 
assist the beleaguered Ja:r;:anese, thus they capitulatea. 28 Within three 
years all three European powers had grabbed pieces of continental China 
for themselves (and all used them as naval bases) and Japan was left 
... 
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standing to plot her revenge. 
Germany pursued what Livezey called a "distorted" Mahan policy in 
which there was no distinction made between sea pov..Br and battle fleet 
strength. Gennany wanted to be a great land and naval pONer, but note 
that Britain, s strength was not based on her land power but rather on 
her control of important areas and the ability to deliver or project 
her naval and limited land pONer to troubled remote regions and Mahan 
had "repeatedly pointed out the whip hand which a superior strategic 
position" Britain had over Gennany vis-a-vis insular positions and 
worldwide control of "maritime fulcra ,,29 Nonetheless Gennany 
continued unabated with its ambitious program to expand and flex its 
muscle in any geographic location where she could benefit, encountering 
her next opportunity in November, 1897. Using as a pretext the murder 
of missionaries by Chinese bandits in the Shantung area, William II 
ordered a naval squadron, under the conmand of Vice Admiral Diederichs, 
to proceed to the harbor of Kiaochou at the southern base of the 
Shantung Peninsula. Once there the Admiral was to threaten reprisals 
and "if, necessary, with the most brutal ruthlessness. 1130 Not planning 
to occupy the harbor at that time, William preferred to wait, declare 
the Chinese response to Gennan danands unsatisfactory and take Kiaochou 
as canpensation. After a short interlude the naval force was ordered 
to occupy the position and China was forced to negotiate a convention 
(6 March, 1898) ceding the harbor and a surrounding neutral area to 
f 
. . 31 Gennany or ninety-nine years. 
International opinion over the seizing of Chinese territory and 
converting it into a "sphere of influence" and a naval base varied, 
~ 
12 
from a noncomnittal reply by Nicholas II of Russia, in which he only 
noted that Russia had occupied the harlx>r before but held no title to 
it nCMT, to a subdued diplomatic concern by American consuls in China 
with regard to the effects of the increasing corrmercial interests in 
the North China area.
32 
Japan sat an:l fumed, plotting her next move 
over the "threat to _p=ace" that the German occupation presented and 
Britain came to the realization that the delicate balance holding China 
together was now gone and it would only be a matter of time tefore the 
scramble for pieces of China would begin. 33 Thus by the time of the 
Spanish-American War Germany was established in not only the Central 
Pacific but on the Asiatic mainland ready to exert its policy of 
"Realpolitik", especially towards the crumbling Pacific colonial 
possessions of SJ;B.in. 
Japan is the next player to be examined. Japan earned the 
suspicion of the United States Navy following the 1897 protest of the 
non-related annexation movement in Hawaii, but was not seen as a 
serious enemy until 1905 when the almost complete destruction of 
Russian military pONer in the Far East tipped the scales in favor of 
JaJ;B.n's ability to exercise political and economic control in the area. 
Even before Mahan's 1890 sea pONer study Japan had begun to exhibit 
exJ;B.nsionist tendencies, gradually ao::ruiring island territories to the 
south and southeast and putting pressure on the frail Spanish 
. . h 'f' 34 possessions in t e Paci ic. By the tirre Mahan's work was translated 
into Japanese the nation was subconsciously prepared for putting into 
effect Mahan's blueprint for success. Japan, in the same strategic 
position as Britain, could not help but adopt the Ma.han philosophy and 
13 
even went as far as making it required reading in its military and 
1 h 1 35 f. t h . . .. nava sc oo s. Its irs post-Ma an strategic move was in Hawaii 
follo.ving the January revolution when she attempted to prevent any 
rnoverrent of the islands closer to American control. Unable to deter 
the action she withdraw and began to look elsewhere for opportunities 
to exercise her own form of "Realpolitik. 1136 
Between 1890 and 1895 a large number of Japanese authors published 
a substantial number of tracts encouraging not only overseas expansion 
but a "large" navy to support the supposedly unstoppable movement of 
territorial acquisition. Akira Iriye has written about the large 
number of these pro-imperialist authors, who needed no outside 
encouragement, but still could foresee the requirement for a strong 
Japanese naval presence to protect expanding canrrercial interests and 
the increasing number of Japanese irmnigrants throughout what the 
Japanese called "Nanyo" or the South Sea Islands. These were German 
and Spanish colonies and considered prime real estate due to the 
negligible white population and the hospitable clirrate. 37 Most of the 
writers stressed that a majority of the desired territories were in 
close proximity to Japan and that Japan should take the lead in 
civilizing that region of the world. Many others saw Hawaii and South 
America as legitimate points for expansion of trade contacts, 
immigration and eventual domination by either Japanese or subjects 
loyal to Japan. 38 By the beginning of the Spanish-American War Japan 
(through peaceful expansion or as the fruit of victory in war) occupied 
positions between the home islands arrl the Philippines, and fran the 
China coast to just north of the Spanish colony of the Mariana's. 
"I 
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The publication of Mahan's book did not inspire the British to 
becorre sea pc:wer adherents because they were the prirre example used in 
The Influence of Sea Power upon History. Livezey noted the impact of 
the book as follows: 
The special import of Mahan's writing for the English was well 
brought out by their press. The English had done great deeds 
of which they were not unaware, but Mahan's analysis brought 
them a~9added understanding of the significance of these deeds. 
Britain benefited fran ~'.Iahan pointing out and analyzing any 
shortcanings of their own policy and how they could learn from the 
lessons of their own history. The British also begin to see where 
threats to their position could arise, from the continent or from 
overseas. The Royal Navy had been in sanewhat of a decline following 
the Crimean War and pressure from French and German imperial dreams and 
new naval programs forced the British to begin to revitalize their own 
cap:tbili ties. The impact of M:than was imneasurable coming as it did at 
a time when British policy makers as well as average citizens 
questioned the place of the nation in \\10rld affairs. International 
complications in Samoa, the Marshall Islands, New Guinea and Africa 
began to provide an impetus for a rejuvenated navy second to none and 
Mahan's "interrelation of geographical factors, comrrerce, 
colonial expansion and navy" as a requirement for greatness was a 
"godsend. 1140 
In one way Mahan's \\10rk helped to end Britain's period of 
"splendid isolation" and to begin to face two serious rivals nearby and 
abroad, who challanged her daninant position on the seas. One rival 
was Ge:rmany with her desire to dominate the continent; and the other, 
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Russia, was relentless in her push for a wanu water port. German 
policy was to assemble a naval force in the North Sea so as to 
challenge Britain in her home waters, where due to colonial obligations 
the Royal Navy was not expected to assemble enough capital ships to 
counter the German challenge, a ndoctrine of risk" which ultirrately 
collapsed following the signing of the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
which permitted Britain to withdraw from the Far East and gather a 
stronger naval force in the British Isles. 41 
Russian threats to British power arose from the conflicting 
interests in the :Mediterranean, the Middle East and Asia. Constant 
pressure on the "old ffi3.n of Europe", the ottoffi3.n Errpire, to gain access 
through and ultirrately control of the Bosporus Straits would jeopardize 
British sea lanes between the hane islands and the colonies to the 
east. 42 Russian pressure also extended to Persia, where she sought an 
outlet through that strategic position amid British sea lanes for the 
nation that controlled the Gulf could effectively interdict East-West 
shipping and the lifeline to India, and beyond. 43 The establishment of 
a strong Russian naval presence in Asia coupled with the slow 
encroachment into Chinese territory only meant that Britain would 
eventually lose its influence in the area, unless she took advantage of 
her superior asset, the Royal Navy. 44 Thus to the British overseas 
bases ~re an important ancillary segment of power projection and the 
protection of its overseas colonies, because only with the forward 
deployment of her naval strength to the Far East could interests be 
protected. Britain, and eventually all the major pcwers, would have 
another reason for acxi:uiring multiple bases and positions: the advent 
16 
of steam po.ver, requiring "coaling and coaling stations," and some 
bases were considered "insignificant save as a convenient coaling 
spot." Al 1 of the rrajor naval po.vers v-.Duld constantly be reminded of 
the fact that steam ships would have to continually refuel at a coal 
depot of sane sort to finish a voyage of any substantial length. 45 
ACQUISITION OF BASES IN ASIA, 1897-1898 
Following the Gennan occupation of Kiaochou and the British view 
that the fragile Chinese Errpire and its waiting rrarkets was ready to 
crumble, it appeared that there was no safety valve to prevent the 
seizing or "negotiating" bases from China. The next po.ver to move into 
Chinese territory was Russia. After a considerable amount of 
rraneuvering and applied pressure, China was persuaded to lease, for 
twenty-five years, the Liaotung Peninsula with the strategic harbor of 
Port Arthur and an extensive neutral "sphere of influence" stretching 
· d' th · 1 46 quite a istance up e peninsu a. 
Others scrambled to try to acquire a piece of China. In May 1897 
the United States, sensing the irrpending partition, considered the 
question of acquiring a coal depot at Chefoo in Fukien province but 
decided against it "on the grounds that the vessels of [the Asiatic] 
squadron could not ccal efficiently fran a single point on the China 
Coast. 1147 Britain was able to profit from this scramble beginning 
negotiations with China (February, 1898) over the extension of British 
interests in the Yang-Tze River valley region and gaining a naval base 
concession at the port of Wei-Hai-vei directly opposite the Russian 
presence at Port Arthur. Britain also began to pressure China into 
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ceding additional land area neighboring Hong Kong at Kowloon but 
delayed negotiations so as to avoid complications with the U.S. Navy 
need for a tanporary refuge at the beginning of the Spanish-Arrerican 
48 d Ch' . . . l' . f War. Ja_pa.n coerce ina into signing a non-a ienation agreement or 
the province of Fukien, directly opposite the island of Taiwan, which 
China had ceded to Ja_pa.n following the Sino-Ja_pa.nese War of 1894-1895. 
The conclusion of the agreement v.ould later create problems for the 
United States Navy as the Fukien area was one of interest to 
planners. 49 The final actors in the scramble for territory were France 
with the occu_pa.tion of the South-east China port of Kwangchau Bay, and 
Italy with an unsuccessful attempt to acquire a coaling station near 
shanghai.so By the tim2 Canmodore Dewey descended on the Philippines, 
the coast of China had already been divided among the other powers, 
with the United States now left in the position of having to defend its 
corrmercial and political interests without a nearby stronghold to 
support any missions. 
The threatened decline of American influence and camnercial 
interests was the outcaue of a contest in which the United States 
either had to defend long term interests with the limited assets it 
possessed and what opportunities might appear on the horizon. No one 
plotted to start a war so that America could acquire colonies and 
penetrate the China market with its supposed teeming millions of 
consumers ready to buy whatever goods were produced for their 
benefit.51 The context of this work is not the China question but 
rather what role the Navy assumed to support an ambiguous national 
policy and what price the Navy paid. The Philippine acquisition 
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question did not hinge primarily on the needs of the Navy because the 
final decision on annexation was made by the President of the United 
States, just as the decision to go to war in 1898 was not based on 
naval or military requirements, but on political grounds determined in 
the White House and approved by the Congress of the United States. The 
"failure" of the Navy to acquire a base in Asia before the Spanish 
American W3.r did not cause the war, only determined one of many 
potential scenarios to occur during the war, the lack of a secure base 
in near proximity being the paramount strategic problern. 52 The 
acquisition of naval bases/spheres by the other powers allowed them to 
exert their influence in the Far East, but it cannot be assurred to have 
led American policy makers to plan and start a war to achieve a parity 
of sorts. 
Failure to acquire a base determined the effectiveness of any 
contemplated military corrmitrnents and increased corrmercial investments 
in the Far East area in terms of projection of parver, because a nearby 
position allCM?ed a power to moniter the activities of other parver. 53 
As an exarrple, for the most part the three major naval powers 
encroaching in China, Britain, Germany and Russia, all had their ceded 
territories situated within a day's sail of the others, and thus were 
not remote and isolated vacuums in which actions could always be 
carried out in the greatest secrecy. The control of a strategic 
location permitted the pCM?ers to keep an eye on each other as well as 
respond to threatening situations such as the Boxer Rebellion. 54 
Internationally, the "prestige" of a base in China was connected with 
what the actual purpose of the base was. Macau, a Portuguese 
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territory, was not an imnediate and long term threat to China's 
territorial integrity. But the same was certainly not true of the 
]X)wers concessions, for in all practicality they had in mind the 
penetration and control of real estate that would be closed off into 
exclusive spheres. The Russian and Japanese eventual goal was the 
complete danination of China (and Korea) which ultimately led to a 
clash of interests and to war.SS German interests, while not benign, 
\Vere not as far-reaching while Britain seemed to be reacting to the 
major powers, although it can not be said that China's own national 
. . .. h 1 . S6 interests were paramount in Britis p anning. 
The desire to access and protect the assumed conswner market of 
China guided Allerican civilian planning, but the U.S. Navy had to 
defend the policy of the government. The ]X)int here is that civilians 
did the planning for expansion without actually consulting the navy as 
to what it would take to protect the expanded interests. The nightmare 
of attempting to create or plan a strategic concept for the nation was 
made much more difficult when the government assurred burdens that it 
could not wholly canmit to and was unwilling to define the national 
]X)licy for the military or worst, support the military planners when 
national policy failures led to threatened hostilities. It is the job 
of the military, under civilian control, to plan for contingencies and 
optimistically before trouble arises. It would appear to be a more 
correct ]X)licy to make plans for all contigencies including the worst 
and hope for the best. But usually Government hopes for the best and 
ends up with the worst, wondering why the armed forces have not been 
able to respond to the challenge effectively. When naval planners were 
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not part of the national policy planning preliminaries it required the 
Navy to use its best judgment on what the policy was and how best to 
defend it. It would not be until 1947 with the creation of the 
Department of Defense and the institution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
that military planning would effectively work with national policy 
planning. But fran 1898 on, the Navy used its own planners to 
' 11 . l' . 57 systernat1ca y create contingency po ic1es. 
One final strategic problem for the Arrerican Navy vis-a-vis the 
Far East was the long distance between the coasts of the United States 
and China. Facing a voyage of almost 8000 nautical miles and no 
territory further west than Midway Island, vessels steaming to the 
Orient had to sail at very low speeds so as to conserve the coal in the 
bunkers, or would have to make periodic stops at points with coal 
depots to refuel. The problem is that these points v.ere almost always 
under the control of a foreign paver who could provide or deny coaling 
rights at their discretion. West of Midway the island groups J?3-Ssed by 
enroute to the Western Pacific and China were controlled by the 
British, French, Germans, Spanish, Jap:lnese, Dutch and Portuguese 
forces. The threat that at any manent a government could decide to 
prohibit Arrerican ships, and most importantly, warships, from entering 
to refuel was possible and did occur. In tirres of possible trouble in 
Asia each nation ensured that its vessels rea=ived highest priority for 
coal. At the beginning of the difficulties between the United States 
and Spain stocks of coal in the Far East were ironopolized and after the 
declaration of war in April, 1898 international neutrality conventions 
prohibited the coaling of belligerent war ships that v.ere capable of 
21 
returning to the scene of hostilities. In 1898 coal was the primary 
fuel for steam ships, as liquid fuels were as yet not used for 
propulsion and would not be for approximately ten years. Overseas coal 
stocks require secure positions to service the vessels of each 
particular nation. No secure ba.ses rreant limited refueling 
opportunities and a reduced mission capability. George Dewey's mission 
in the Far East was at the mercy of such a condition. 58 
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CHAPTER II 
THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN THE PHILIPPINES 
PLANNING, 1896-1898 
The year 1958 is pivotal in any reassessment of the history of the 
United States involvement in the Philippines. 1958 was the year in 
which the naval records relevant to the period of the Spanish Arrerican 
War were finally made public. The belief shared by historians, such as 
Walter Lafeber and Julius Pratt, after 19581 , that Alfred Thayer Mahan 
and Theodore Roosevelt (assisted by Henry Cabot Lodge) conspired to 
seize and perrra.nently occupy the Philippines before the 
Spanish-American W:l.r has been rrost difficult to dispel, regardless of 
the fact that the pertinent records and docurrents, opened for public 
inspection during the years 1954 to 1958, disprove the allegations. 2 
The excellent pioneering work done by William R. Braisted, 
utilizing records of the Navy held by the National Archives and the 
Naval Historical Division, is the definitive study of the period and 
firmly refutes any ccnspiracy theory. Braisted disclosed, for the 
first time, that the original idea for offensive operations against the 
Philippines was conceived two years before the start of the war. 3 
Qui~t:sirnply, Arrerican naval strategists had been drawing up 
contingency plans in the event of an outbreak of war with Spain over 
the troublesane and recurring Cuban question: 
. . . the outbreak of a new insurrection in the island of Cuba 
early in 1895, obliged the naval planners to turn their 4 attention to the possibility of canplications with Spain. 
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It is important to note that among the naval planners, Mahan was 
never consulted, and neither Roosevelt nor Lcx1ge were included. Who, 
then, v.ere these naval planners? During the period prior to the 
Spanish-American War there were two groups involved with naval planning 
and neither was connected to the fonnulation or the development of a 
broad national war policy. The first group was the Naval War College 
in Newport, Rhcx1e Island, under the auspices of Captain Henry C. 
Taylor, and the second was the Office of Naval Intelligence, under the 
direction of Lieutenant Commander Richard Wainwright.
5 
Following a CUban insurrection in 1895 ( there had been periodic 
trouble dating fran 1867), the Naval War College staff took the 
opportunity to assign the officer student class of 1895 a "special 
problem" dealing with Spain and CUba. 6 Taylor and his staff canpiled 
the students work into a draft war plan, and in January, 1896, 
forwarded it to the Navy Department for review, cormnent and revision. 
This draft plan dealt solely with a naval campaign against Spain and 
its possessions in the Caribbean and made no mention of the 
Philippines. How then did the Philippines get into the planning 
picture? Ronald Spector noted: 7 
Perhaps inspired by the War College example, the Office of 
Naval Intelligence ... , soon produced its own plan for war 
with Spain . • . • 
The plan, "General Scheme of War with Spain, 1896," was completed 
through the work of Staff Intelligence Officer, Lieutenant William W. 
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Kimball. 8 Kin1ball, though not working or consulting with Mahan, was 
nonetheless a Mahan disciple. 9 Strongly favoring the concept of a 
"purely naval war," Kimball's plan called for offensive operations 
against Spanish forces and possessions in the the Caribbean, the 
Spanish mainland, and in the Pacific. 10 
Kb-nball 's completed plan (dated 1 June, 1896) was originally 
deemed unsatisfactory after it was reviewed by the War College staff. 
The staff saw no reason to violate the doctrine of concentrated 
strength by dividing the limited American naval forces throughout three 
areas (the Asiatic Squadron, a mobile Flying Squadron, and the rest 
assembled in Caribbean waters) and favored their own earlier 1895 plan 
as the best one in existence. Kimball's suggestion regarding the 
Philippines, to which the staff objected as not being a feasible 
target, revealed his belief in and admiration of Mahan's philosophies, 
advocating the extension of operations to the enemy. Kirrball perceived 
that by extending offensive operations to Spain's Pacific colonies it 
would provide the United States with leverage in any future peace 
negotiations. The planner considered Manila's usefulness primarily as 
a "hostage. "11 
In late 1896 a special board was convened by the Secretary of the 
Navy, Hilary A. Herbert, to review the contingencies in case of war 
with Spain. Both the War College and Kirrball plans were studied and 
the board accepted Kimball's plan minus the Philippine "sideshow. 1112 
Following Cleveland's defeat in the 1896 election, Secretary Herbert 
decided not to seek President Cleveland's approval of the Kirrball plan 
31 
so as not to comrni t the incoming McKinley appointees to a policy. He 
passed on to the incoming Secretary, John D. Long, the plans for 
operations against Spain. Long and his vigorous Assistant Secretary, 
Theodore Roosevelt, also inherited all of the previous War College 
planning studies and war problems held by the Off ice of Naval 
11 . 13 Inte igence. Desiring clearer alternatives to the contradictions of 
the various plans and proposals, in Spring of 1897 Long ordered the 
above mentioned special board to reconvene with a new membership and 
reconsider the plans. 14 
With Roosevelt "cheer leading," what finally emerged in July, 1897 
was basically a modified Kimball plan. 15 Spector pointed out the 
. . . 1 ed . h 1 . 16 interpretation invo v in any sue p anning: 
Although the Board's plan 
"Official Plan", it by no 
policy. 
of July, 1897 was dubbed the 
means represented administration 
Indeed, Roosevelt himself could not persuade President McKinley 
and Secretary Long to initiate any action on the plan to rnake it 
ff . . 1 1 . 17 , . 11 . h f h . . 18 o icia po icy. Wi iarn R. T ayer wrote o t e situation: 
. . . the young Roosevelt had to act with circumspection. In 
the first place the policy of the Department was formulated by 
Secretary Long. In next place the Navy could not come into 
action until President McKinley and the Department of State 
gave the word. 
This is the point where the evidence that many historians cite as 
proof of Roosevelt's conspiracy to acquire the Philippines begins to 
accumulate. Much of it can be found in his correspondence to 
acquaintances in which he confidently tells them that the Arrerican 
Asiatic Squadron was "quite canpetent" and capable of capturing the 
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Philippines and pinning down the Spanish forces there.19 Furthermore, 
the move by Roosevelt to get Conmodore George Dewey appointed as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Squadron only added credence to the 
distortion. Roosevelt wanted Dewey because he respected 
professionalism and came to the conclusion that Dewey's rival, senior 
by one lineal number, was incapable of carrying out any of the 
provisions of the Kimball war plan. Unaware of the planning, Mahan 
[.JOintedly urged Roosevelt to find the best person for the camnand, 
feeling that the Pacific would be the next scene of conflict. 20 The 
duty of Rooseve 1 t, as he hin1sel f saw it, was to perform a job well, and 
his job was to prepare the Navy for any contingency, including war. 
This appears to have been misconstrued by historians, J:::ased on letters 
Roosevelt sent to several acquaintances in which he advocated 
preparations and offensive operations against Spain in case war broke 
out. 21 Roosevelt respected a man of forcefulness and decisiveness, 
qualities he felt Dewey [.JOssessed, qualities that the Ccmrodore could 
utilize to ensure the Navy's readiness. In September, 1897, the normal 
rotation date for relief of the Canrrander-in-Chief of the Asiatic 
Squadron came up, and Roosevelt persuaded Dewey to use [.JOlitical 
. h . . 22 connections to get t e position. Theodore Roosevelt's decision to 
bypass the Navy's seniority system was not designed to advance any 
jingoist ambitions attributed to him but to properly prepare for any 
and all contigencies that might lead to war. 23 Between the date of his 
ap[.JOintment ( 21 October, 189 7) and his departure for Asia ( 7 December, 
1897) Dewey, previously unaware of the particulars of the Kimball plan, 
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was briefed and prepared by Roos eve 1 t so as to be ready to take action 
following his assumption of corrrnana. 24 
The final nail in the conspiracy theory is the "infamous" 
preparatory rressage Roosevelt sent to Dewey on 25 February, 1898, nine 
days after the Maine blew up in Havana Harbor: 25 
Secret and Confidential 
Order the squadron to ... Hong Kong. Keep full of coal. In 
event of declaration of War, Spain, your duty will be to see 
that the Spanish Squadron does not leave the Asiatic Coast, 
and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands . . . . 
Roosevelt 
All Roosevelt had done was to pre-position Dewey's forces in case 
of war and had not unleashed him for inmediate action against Spanish 
naval forces in the Philippines. Dewey assembled his comnand (four 
units in Hong Kong and two enroute) in Hong Kong to await further 
orders while the United States continued negotiations with Spain to 
.d 26 1 . a 27 avo1 war. Rooseve t na : 
.•• Si.ill.ply irnplerrent[ed] regular Navy Department policy 
following the schedule already v-.Drked out in conjunction with 
the Kimball war plan, a plan that was not only followed by 
Theodore Roosevelt, but by John I.Dng, and the conmander in 
chief [of American military forces], President William 
McKinley. 
Between the date of Roosevelt's telegram and the start of the 
Spanish-American War (April 21, 1898) the United States Navy prepared 
for possible war as Roosevelt concerned himself with normal 
administrative duties at the Department. Alfred T. Ma.han, retired and 
on vacation, did not return fran Europe until after the outbreak of 
war, having no role in the actual decision to "declare" war, a decision 
that was beyond the ascribed pONers of Roosevelt, Ma.han and Lodge. 28 
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Janes A. Field has rejected the notion of such interpretation by 
historians who fail to utilize the sources available to them. He 
noted:29 
Much of [American history texts on imperialism] is wrong and 
most of it irrelevant to 'imperialism' and the events of 1898. 
The proof only supports Field's contention that historians have 
overblown the participation of the three men in the Philippine issue. 30 
What was the role of each and how did the legend get its start? In not 
one of his many works prior to the start of the war did l\tlahan mention 
the Philippines. His direct contribution to operations during the war 
is his service on the Naval War Board, set up by Secretary Long (March, 
1898) to advise him on strategy. 31 Mahan's inclusion in the conspiracy 
is due mainly to his influential writings and 'M:lrldwide "notoriety." 
. ed 32 George T. Davis not : 
The naval advocates of the period stated their case for sea 
po...ver largely in the terms of the Mahan dialectic. 
Having previously disposed of Roosevelt and Mahan in the 
conspiracy, that leaves only Lodge. He had no direct role in the 
planning or implementation of the Kimball plan, but he was with 
33 Roosevelt on the day that the preparatory telegram was sent to Dewey. 
Lodge's primary role in the alleged conspiracy occurred after the war. 
Lodge wanted to docurrent for an article the events prior to the war, 
and being privy to sane of than, had to avoid specifics that 'M:luld 
embarrass the Navy because of the success of its planning. 34 The 
desire to downplay and neglect the actual role of navy planners was 
motivated in fact, to protect the Navy and keep it out of any fight 
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between the imperialists and anti-imperialists, as the prior 
preparations carried out by the Navy could be viewed by the 
anti-imperialists as having caused the war. By shifting the 
responsibility from the Navy to Roosevelt it served the dual purpose of 
avoiding t.~e disclosure of the Navy's efforts and pranoting Roosevelt 
as a national hero, with Mahan and Lodge carried along on his 
coattails. 
It is the Lodge article along with the private papers of the three 
rren that contributed to the legend of the conspiring imperialists. 
Protecting the Navy and advancing their national irrages only added to 
the theory of plots and scherres. 35 The events involved in the actual 
conduct of the war in the Philippines \.\ere out of the hands of the 
three and under the control of the on-the-scene commanders. 
PREPARATIONS: JANUARY-MAY, 1898 
Theodore Roosevelt's 25 February telegram to Dewey has been 
h . d . 1 . nd . beh . 36 c aracterize as impu sive a irrpetuous avior: 
Even though a subordinate official in the Navy Department 
[Roosevelt] has choreographed the first step in the seizure of 
a Pacific Empire, his supervisors either intentionally or 
carelessly neglected to cancel his orders. In this, as in so 
many other instances associated with the Spanish-American War, 
major policy just seaned to materialize in an ad hoc manner. 
The assertion that Roosevelt's telegrain was just a whimsical 
misadventure ignores the body of evidence available, attributing more 
to the action and repeating fallacies that the administration was 
dragged into war because of the telegram. 
Roosevelt's vigorous and foresighted actions during his short 
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tenure at the Navy Department is given such a major role in history but 
for the wrong reason, because he was successful. 37 His intention was 
to prepare and uwrade the Navy in many areas, including personnel, 
materiel, gunnery, ship-building, logistics and strategic planning. 
The last aspect is frequently overlooked as was his influence upon the 
Department. He looked uµ:m strategic planning as a most important 
facet and preparedness as an essential element. In the r:eriod of June, 
1897 to March, 1898 his long term goal of a strong Navy, as evidenced 
by his letters and professional actions, was predicated on the 
perception that it was necessary to be prepared for any foe. 38 Even 
before the Cutan situation had reached a crisis level Roosevelt was 
equally concerned that the United States would have to deal with Japan 
in the eastern half of the Pacific over the Hawaiian Islands annexation 
question and asked the staff at the Naval War College to develop a plan 
f h 
. 39 or sue a contingency. Following the December, 1897 withdrawal by 
Japan of their diplanatic protest over the annexation efforts, 
Roosevelt and the Navy, were able to focus their undivided attention on 
th . h 40 e Span1s . Preparation was Roosevelt's key concern and the extent 
of his influence and efforts leads to an examination of other 
individual's actions. 
Notwithstanding Roosevelt's telegram to Dewey on 25 February, 
1898, Secretary Long himself had quite a large part in the Navy's 
preparations for conflict. Long, through the Department, ordered the 
overseas stations (January, 1898) to retain until further notice all 
seamen whose enlistments had expired. 41 The George Dewey Papers 
provide a rewarding glimpse of Secretary Long's actions regarding 
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preparations for war with Spain and offensive operations in the 
Philippines. From 26 February, 1898 to 24 April, 1898, Long 
telegraphed Dewey on at least fifteen occasions, regarding 
. 1 . t' d h h'l' . 42 preparations, ogis ics an t e P i ippines. The fact that Secretary 
Long, and not Roosevelt, authorized and originated the telegrams seems 
to escape the scrutiny of many historians. The telegrams themselves 
do, ho1Aever, tend to attest to the influence Roosevelt had on his 
superior, spurring Long into more vigorous and decisive action. 
Roosevelt was in effect carrying out duties that the Secretary himself 
should have been performing. Those efforts went far in assuring that 
De1Aey was ready for the possible outbreak of hostilities. 
The preparations of both the American and Spanish Naval forces in 
the Pacific are themselves a study of ca:nparisons and contrasts. 
Within six weeks of Cormnodore Dewey's assumption of camnand of the 
Asiatic Squadron the Ma.ine was destroyed and Dewey began his own 
preparations. From the scattered units of the Squadron he began 
requesting and receiving information as to the movements of foreign 
warships and, most importantly, inquiries as to the availability and 
reliability of his most precious and least expendable cormnodity, 
coal. 43 The distance between the nearest American port and Dewey's 
corrrnand was over 7,000 miles. lacking a naval base in the area, 
Dewey's small fleet was dependent on, and at the mercy of the local 
support system, often under the contra 1 of third parties. This major 
difficulty, the inability to secure supplies in a timely manner, and 
having to compete for naval stores with other foreign naval vessels in 
the Orient, created an intolerable situation for the squadron, one that 
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threatened its ability to effectively execute its assigned mission 
. h . h 1 f . h h'l' . 44 against t e Spanis nava orces in t e P i ippines. The priority of 
the issue was raised by Long with his 26 February telegram to Dewey 
ordering the squadron to "keep full of coal, the best that can be 
had. 1145 Dewey replied on 27 February he was faced wit,-, a "Great 
scarcity of coal" and requested that coal and ammunition be transported 
fran San Francisco, reiterating the request on 11 March, stressing 
46 "Other governments have bought a 11 gcx:xi coal • " That same day Long 
gave Dewey authorization to contract for delivery of coal from third 
parties and ordered him to obtain English coal, if possible. 47 Dewey 
was caught in a race for tirne and in competition with other naval 
forces buying up large arrounts of naval stores in anticipation of 
war 48 The squadron's problem was temporarily solved by Long's 
authorization to purchase two British auxiliaries with 3,000 tons of 
coal and the acquisition of 1,900 tons of coal fran a supplier in 
Shanghai.49 The last item, coal fran Shanghai, presented the 
possibility that Chinese neutrality v.;ould have to be violated after the 
outbreak of war, with a Dewey observation of "international 
complications receiving consideration", noting the possible dilerma. 50 
The danger of being cut off from supplies, and the threat that a 
declaration of war would deny Dewey's force the opportunity to utilize 
repair facilities and logistical support located in non-belligerent 
ports, would play a major role in American naval planning for the next 
two decades. Dewey's purchase of the two auxiliaries permitted the 
squadron to transport a supply train with it, but "military necessity" 
forced Dewey to willfully plan the violation of Chinese neutrality in 
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the event that Britain followed international conventions to the letter 
and forced the Asiatic Squadron out of Hong Kong following any 
declaration of war. 51 
Preparations for war were also being undertaken by the Spanish, 
and their naval forces in the Philippines 'irJ'ere in a worse situation 
than the American forces. As a weak empire, Spain's military 
capabilities were inconsequential and incapable of assuring the safe 
transportation of the necessary logistical support to the Philippines. 
The senior Spanish naval cannander, Admiral Patricio Montojo y Pasaron, 
was forced to utilize whatever meager resources were held by the 
Spanish in the islands. The Spanish had guessed as early as January 
that the Philippines would be a logical target in a war with the United 
States and confirrration was received in J.1113.rch when the Germa.n consul in 
Hong Kong cabled Berlin a sumrrary of his conversation with the American 
consul, Rousenville Wildman, supposedly relating the contents of the 25 
February telegram Roosevelt sent to Dewey. The Kaiser then informed 
the Spanish who notified her outpost in 52 early March. Montojo's 
corrmand of 37 vessels was scattered throughout various islands, 
defeating the doctrine of concentrated strength, and significantly 
contributing to the defeat of the Spanish. 53 Montojo had given 
consideration to raids upon American shipping in the Pacific and even 
to attacks on locations along the california coast, but lacking a 
secure system of supply lines and a naval base, in fact no safe refuge 
east of the Marianas Islands, abandoned the idea. 54 Unable to 
undertake offensive operations against the United States, Montojo was 
left with five options for defending the Philippines:
55 
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(1) Meeting DeW2y's fleet on the oren sea for a traditional 
naval battle, 
(2) repositioning his forces and assembling them at an 
incomplete naval base north of Manila (Subic Ba.y), awaiting 
Dewey's advance towards Manila and then striking from the 
rear, 
(3) anchoring under the protection of Manila's batteries and 
using them as supporting firepower, 
(4) anchoring near Cavite, southwest of Manila, and 
utilizing the batteries of the naval arsenal there or, 
(5) dispersing his forces throughout the islands making 
Dewey waste vital coal supplies tracking down the vessels. 
The first option was not seriously considered because of the 
unseaworthiness of many of the 56 vessels. Oi:)tion three was not 
supported by Governor General Ba.silio Augustin y Davila because it 
would make the city a legitimate military target for naval 
bombardrnent. 57 Option five, considered the best plan, was also vetoed 
by Augustin as the civilian population of Manila feared being abandoned 
58 by the navy. 
The Subic Ba.y option presented some interesting strategic 
advantages. A holding action at the bay would have led to a drawn out 
encounter for Dewey, a dilemma which could have forestalled his 
victory. A very good natural harbor, Subic Ba.y is approachable from 
the sea by only one narrow entrance at the southern end of the bay 
guarded by a small island (Grande Island) and surrounded by high hills 
on the western, northern and eastern sides. The Asiatic Squadron was 
not supported by any land forces and thus, until reinforced from the 
continental United States, could not "rerrfE_nently" hold any positions 
ashore they might attempt to occupy, particularly .Manila and Subic 
Ba.ys. The Asiatic Squadron could only effectively face other naval 
units and rraritirne vessels. With the Spanish ensconced in SUbic Ba.y, 
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safely behind any batteries on Grande Island, Dewey 1MJuld have been 
forced to divide his snall force to guard both bays and would have been 
at the mercy of hit and run tactics. Split into two ccm:i;xments, one to 
secure Manila Bay and the other to prevent a breakout of Montojo, the 
Asiatic Squadron could have been overwhelmed and defeated in detail.
59 
As early as the 1850's, the Spanish had considered relocating 
their main naval base frcm Manila Bay to Subic Bay, recognizing the 
difficulties of defending the large expanse of Manila Bay, but the 
project was fought by uncooperative Army officials, who loathed the 
idea of giving up the secure and social life of Manila for an isolated 
and primitive area. 60 After 1885 the bay was connected to Manila by a 
trunk rail line and a telegraphic link, but that failed to persuade the 
army to support the navy's desire to relocate the base from Cavite. 61 
The Jap:mese victory in the Sino-Japanese Viar in 1895 and t..lie fear of a 
southward thrust by Japan forced the Spanish to increase expenditures 
of funds for building a base at Subic, eventually spending several 
millions of dollars by 1898. 62 The work done at the naval base by the 
start of the Spanish-Arrerican \/\far was insufficient to support ccmbined 
operations, lacking substantial fortifications and coastal batteries on 
Grande Island. The rese facilities -were for the most part inccmplete 
and only a srrall arrount of landscaping (damming and rerouting creeks 
and rivers) had been ccmpleted. Montojo did withdraw to Subic on the 
25th of April, but UfX)n his arrival discovered that the Army had not 
completed the fortifications at Grande, the batteries laying on the 
beach instead of on their mounts. Following a council of war, Montojo 
decided that the inccmplete defenses and the forty fathom depth of the 
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harbor meant his force would suffer heavy casualties in men and 
materiel. Left with little opportunity to defeat Dewey and wishing to 
salvage sane honor for Sp:i.in, Montojo accepted the fourth option and 
withdrew on the 29th of April, returned to Cavite and anchored at 
canacao Bay under the protection of the batteries at the cavite naval 
1 . , d 63 arsena to await Dewey s a vance. 
Following the British declaration of neutrality in Hong Kong on 24 
April, requiring belligerents to depart the colony within forty eight 
hours, Dewey ordered his units to complete preparations and then left 
Hong Kong, assembling in Mirs Bay, thirty miles east of Hong Kong and 
in Chinese territorial waters. Rationalizing the action as one of 
military need, DeW2y also recognized that China was in no position to 
protest the violation of her neutrality. 64 Despite the fact that he 
was in a remote position, Dewey was constantly inforrred of the Spanish 
preparations in the Philippines, using the American Consul-General, 
Oscar F. Williams, as a conduit of inforrration. Williams' last rressage 
to Dewey informed him that Montojo had moved his units to Subic Bay. 
The dipl0itat reluctantly left the Philippines following the declaration 
of war and sailed to Hong Kong on a British stearrer. 65 
Dewey's forces got underway on 27 April, arriving in the Subic Bay 
vicinity three days later. Dewey entered the bay, found no enemy 
forces, then headed towards Manila Bay. The squadron entered the large 
bay at midnight, suffering no casualties frcm the few batteries on 
Bataan that fired upon the Arrerican ships. At 5:30 A.M. the squadron 
began its attack on the anchored Sp:i.nish forces, breaking off once to 
count the amount of anmunition left. This break during the engagement 
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has caused much controversy, but in fact it was caused by a miscount of 
shells and Dewey hauled out to take stock of his situation. He 
signaled the other ships in the squadron to break for breakfast, thus 
starting a legend that Dewey contemptuously had pulled out of action. 66 
By noon the Spanish had, for all intents and puq.Dses, no naval forces 
left in the Philippines capable of evicting the American Navy. The 
strategy and tactics of the Battle of J\1anila Bay followed traditional 
warfare concepts in which Dewey used a line f orrnation to steam back and 
forth five times, bombarding the hapless Spanish forces, totally 
. he 67 h . . f 11 . he . destroying t rn. T e most il1l[X)rtant question o owing t victory 
on 1 May, 1898, was "what next?" What was the next course of action 
and what limited the extent? The Kimball plan called for holding 
Manila as a hostage. Na.val planners had never envisioned territorial 
acquisition as the result of a victory. Only Dewey could shape the 
events because he was cut off from the outside world and the official 
report of victory took five days to reach the United States. 68 
RESULTS OF VICTORY 
In dramatically demonstrating that Spain was far too weak to 
defend it's islands the United States had threatened to 
disturb the balance of paver in the Far East. The Philippines 
suddenly became the hottest item the current imperial market 
had to offer. Like Brer Rabbit, the United States was stuck 
like a Tar Baby; it could not simply order its na~9 to steam out of Manila bay and leave a paver vacuum behind. 
Dewey's victory at Manila presented the United States and the Navy 
with unforseen problems. What soould the next step be and how much 
should Arrerica involve herself in Asian affairs at the end of the war? 
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The first question was exacerbated by Dewey's r::osition in Mcmila Bay, 
and the second was influenced by almost purely economic and political 
events, the almost canplete division of China's coast by the other 
70 powers. 
The destruction of the Spanish naval forces on the first of May 
did not automatically extend Arrerican control throughout the Philippine 
Islands, much less the city of Manila. Dewey's small squadron still 
had to subdue the batteries in Mcmila and cavite. After the 
destruction of the remaining afloat units the squadron anchored within 
range of the guns of the city and Dewey conveyed the message to the 
Spanish military canmander in the city that he would spare the city a 
bombardment as long as the batteries remained . . 71 inactive. Another 
demand, or request, that Dewey sought was the joint use of the Mcmila 
to Hong Kong cable so as to keep in touch with his superiors in 
washington. The Spanish authorities refused to share the cable and 
Dewey ordered the cable severed, the act, completed by nightfall, left 
Dewey isolated from his leaders. In Dewey's mistaken opinion, and due 
largely to a lack of information, he believed that the Spanish were 
also cut off from any contact with Sp:i.in, but as it turns out there 
were two additional cable lines, one originating further North ending 
in Hong Kong and the second originating in the South, terminating in 
Singapore. The act of cutting the cable is one of the most criticized 
acts that Dewey had carried out, as it would provide arrmunition to the 
Anti-Imperialists that he had done so that the Philippine annexation 
question would be carried out in a political vacuum. Dewey's decision 
to sever the cable was understandable, ha-1ever, because in his position 
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a functional cable would have allowed the Spanish to telegraph M3.drid, 
detail his rather weakened and exposed position, and request additional 
support. It would be about two weeks before Dewey discovered the other 
working cables. Note that shortly thereafter Dewey was constantly on 
edge regarding the disposition of a fleet that had been sent eastward 
through the Suez Canal with the intention of relieving the Spanish 
forces in the islands. As further justification for Dewey's action, 
the Naval War Board in Washington D.C., composed of three senior naval 
officers (M3.han was a member) advising the Secretary of the Navy on 
strategy in the war, recorrmended just the same action in regard to the 
blockade of CUba when it was discovered that the cable between the 
island arrl Janaica was providing information back to Madrid. 72 
The first word regarding the events of the B:lttle of Manila came 
fran the Spanish themselves. During a lull in the battle, a telegram 
to Madrid gave details of the battle and stated that the enemy had been 
driven off, (actually the Americans took a break for meals and 
conferences) . Fol lowing the complete destruction of the Spanish fleet 
a second telegram was sent in which the damage estimates to the Spanish 
ships v.ere provided. The inconsistencies, regarding damage suffered, 
of the two telegrams were too obi vious and 2 May, second of M3.y, 
planners in the United States detennined that D2wey had IADn the battle, 
much to the relief of the Navy department and the White House. Dewey, 
ignorant of the Spanish corrrnunications, waiting for his situation to 
stabilize, did not send out an official report until he released one of 
his ships to return to Hong Kong with two telegrams containing the good 
news. His reports indicated that he would require "land forces" to 
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capture the city of Manila and requested additional support, including 
ammunition. He also added that there were a large number of foreign 
warships in the harbor and that canplications might arise over the 
hi . h 73 Gennan s ps in t e area. 
By the second of May foreign interest in the activities of Manila 
Bay manifested itself with the arrival of a British warship, followed 
within days by warships of Gennany, Japan and France. It was the 
German arrival that was to present problems because Cewey tended to 
exaggerate his difficulties and he mislead the Navy Department 
regarding Gerrran intent and on occasion failed to report incidents to 
his superiors. Whatever may have started the bad feelings between 
CeW2y and the Germans, and they appear to have begun l:efore 1 May, 
1898, the period of heightened tension would led to a bias on the 
Navy's part vis-a-vis Gennany, especially as Cewey would be in a 
position to influence planning for about twenty years. Within days of 
the Battle of Manila DeW2y was praroted to Admiral of the Navy, the 
senior position in the navy and eventually became the senior planner 
among the arrred forces of the United States. 74 
Within days of CeW2y's victory and influenced by his report, the 
Naval War Board suggested, and President McKinley agreed, that support 
should be sent to the American forces in the Philippines. Another 
suggestion recorrmended the capture of a coaling station between San 
Francisco and the Philippines so as to provide a way station for the 
navy in case of trouble with other Spanish forces, which were suspected 
of heading towards the Philippines. Guam was selected as the best 
location and on 23 May a convoy of volunteers troops, escorted by the 
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Navy, left San Francisco for Guam. Arriving on 20 June the island was 
captured with no fight on the part of the uninforrred Spanish forces. 
The convoy left and arrived in Manila Bay on 30 June. The irrportance 
of Guam served to intensify Dewey's isolated and weak position, because 
if he was forced to withdraw from the Philippines the nearest safe 
American refuge would be the west coast, a distance of 7,000 nautical 
miles, as Britain, France, Japan, and Germany had declared neutrality. 
Coal supplies were also insufficient to provide service to all the 
naval warships in the Far East. There existed a threat that Spain 
would be sending part of its naval forces through the Suez Canal to 
relieve the city and destroy the American squadron, and in fact a 
Spanish force did go through the Suez Canal and got as far as the Red 
Sea before turning back following the defeat of Spanish forces in the 
Caribbean. This victory not only relieved any Spanish pressure on the 
Atlantic coast of the United States but also freed up units of the Navy 
to threaten Spain itself and possibly to reinforce Dewey. 75 
Irrmediate national and international interest in the fate of the 
Philippines and other Spanish possessions in the Pacific caused much 
speculation. There was an increasing desire on the part of many 
Americans not to withdraw after such a glorious defeat of the Spanish. 
The "large Policy" clique saw this as the opportunity to extend the 
benefits of American culture and canmerce into the Far East, concurrent 
with the increase in American power and influence in a region where 
other powers had carved up the coast of China. The United States 
acquisition of the island i;:ermanently would give the country a 
marketplace and a window overlooking Asia, an American "Hong Kong." 
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The Naval viSN[.X)int was that if the United States planned on keeping 
the islands and extending comrrercially throughout the region, then a 
naval l:::ase would be required in the Far :East as well as any ancillary 
bases between the United States and the Far :East to support the 
national policy in that regard. Guam fit this category as well as some 
f h th . h . . h . f. 76 o t e o er Spa.nis possessions in t e Paci ic. 
Of all of the foreign pov-.:ers interested in the Philippines, 
Germany and Japa.n had more than a passing interest. The German 
decision to send a strong force to :Manila Bay was not designed to 
challenge Dewey, but rather to try to stake a claim to the islands in 
case he did withdraw. The Genna.ns, consistent with its "Realpolitik" 
policy, hoped to gain territories in the event of any division of the 
Spanish territories. The Japa.nese were also interested in staking a 
territorial claim but her actions in the Philippines were not as 
threatening and Japa.n was too concerned with the scramble for chunks of 
China to challenge the United States, a nation with which just months 
l::efore she had done just that with regard to the Hawaii annexation 
issue. Japa.nese and German desires were that the islands not go back 
to Spanish control and both nations were just biding their time. 
Incidents between the U.S. Navy and the German naval forces intensified 
Lev-.:ey's :i;:ersonal stress levels because of the unknarm quality of the 
German interest, and were further heightened by the unknCJWn intentions 
and postion of the Spa.nish fleet suspected of being enroute to the 
Philippines. The few British vessels in the harbor observed all 
diplc:matic and military protocols and somewhat alleviated Lev-.:ey's 
tension. The British presence there was based on also finding out what 
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intentions the Am2rican government had regarding the islands and to 
keep watch on German actions there, as the British were intent that any 
American withdrawal \'AJuld not create a vacuum filled by Gennany, a 
situation that Ja:pa.n also wished to avoid. 77 
Notwithstanding D2wey's discomfort, the American decision 
regarding the islands was slow in coalescing. President McKinley, 
unsure of what action to take, eventually came to agree with advisors 
and popular opinion that the United States must maintain sane presence 
there and decided to keep the island of Luzon with its harbor at 
Manila. By August 13, 1898 following the defeat of all the Spanish 
naval forces in caribbean waters and the lessening of the threat 
against Dewey, an annistice was declared and a peace conference was 
scheduled for September. By the time the American comnissioners 
arrived in Paris for the conference, McKinley had decided that the only 
appropriate action would be to take all of the Philippine Islands. 
careful consideration detennined that the United States could not 
withdraw from the islands, nor could it just take a portion of the 
islands and leave the others to the mercy of the S:pa.nish, or worse yet, 
have the other major powers control them. That predicament \'AJuld have 
possibly endangered the American position in Manila, econcmically and 
politically, thus the only logical choice for McKinley was to demand 
the entire archipelago and the island of Guam as part of the peace 
process. Following the completion of negotiations in Paris between the 
United States and Spain the Treaty of Paris brought peace between the 
two belligerents. The United States received the Philippines, Guam, 
and Puerto Rico for a price of twenty million dollars. CUba received a 
50 
nominal independence under Arrerican supervision. The rerraining Spanish 
possessions in the Pacific were sold to Germany with the United States 
and Germany now hostile neighbors. The final act between Spain and the 
United States regarding the Pacific came after the discovery that not 
all of the islands of the Philippines had been transferred to the 
United States. Germany tried to take advantage of the situation but 
within a year the islands were effectively under Arrerican control. 
Although there would never be open hostilities between the two nations 
in the Pacific, the mutual suspicions caused Arrerican Naval planners to 
f b h . . h . f. 78 expect war are etween t e nations in t e Paci ic. 
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CHAP1'ER I II 
DEFENDING THE WESTERN PACIFIC, 1898-1913 
NAVAL BASE PROBLEMS, 1898-1904 
The acquisition of the Philippines by the United States did not 
autonatically create a base in the Western Pacific for the Navy. A 
purpose, a location and the funding for the base had to be established. 
The first was simply the protection of American commercial and 
political interests in the Far East, as the general scramble for chunks 
of the Chinese Empire had from the start threatened to pre-empt the 
tenuous America position in the Orient. Not even the policy statements 
of the "Open Door" notes1 , issued by the United States, could solidly 
ensure the retention of an economic position, significantly if the 
American government was unwilling to use all options, including the 
military, to back up its public declarations. Arrerican military 
intervention in the Far East between 1898 and 1918 arrounted to a single 
episode, the participation in the relief of the Peking Legations during 
the Boxer Rebellion (August, 1900). That service was carried out with 
Marines diverted from the campaign against the Philippine insurrection 
(1899-1902), presenting a hardship to the military ccrnmander in the 
islands, General Arthur MacArthur. The decision to participate in the 
relief expedition only served to demonstrate to the Navy the need for a 
Far East naval base to support missions in near proximity, a search 
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that had begun years earlier. 2 
The dust had barely settled in Manila Bay following the American 
victory on 1 May, 1898, when the Naval War Board reviewed the conduct 
of the war in the Pacific and Dewey's exposed position. The 
uncertainty regarding Germa.n intentions in the islands and the 
possibility of the arrival of a su:perior Sp:i_nish naval fleet in the 
Pacific led the Board to recanmend that two heavily arrred moniters, 
three battleships and a cruiser be sent to the Far East to reinforce 
Dewey. Dev,;ey's position was so precarious that even though he was 
limited in ccaling opportunities and supplies the dep:i_rtrnent ordered 
him to remain on station in the Manila area, and specifically ordered 
him not to attack or undertake the military occup:i_tion of the Caroline 
Islands, 1700 nautical miles to the east of the Philippines, where 
Naval Intelligence had reported a 5,000 pound stockpile of coal. 
Dewey, plain and simple, could not afford the luxury of military 
activity outside the area of Manila until he received sufficient 
reinforcements. By the beginning of the armistice (13 August, 1898) 
the original vessels involved in the Bcittle of Manila Bciy had been on 
station long enough to worry Dewey as to the ability of his corrmand to 
maintain canb:tt readiness, a concern which would require dry-docking 
facilities to determine the wear and tear on the hulls of the vessels. 
Those facilities were not easily found in the Philippines (one of the 
reasons for the poor condition of the Spanish fleet at Dev,;ey's 
arrival), but in the ports of neutral powers, Britain (Hong Kong) and 
Jap:i_n (Yokohama). 
belligerents, neutral 
Under international conventions regarding 
nations were prohibited fran supporting the 
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upkeep and repair of combatants belonging to the parties at war other 
than those needed to return home. Dewey was concerned enough about his 
position and readiness that he planned, as a contingency, to withdraw 
to Subic :&ly in case of a successful Spanish sortie to the Philippines, 
a rrovernent that Admiral Montojo had attempted to do prior to 1 May, 
1898. The Admiral's view (as well as Dewey's) of Subic was that it was 
the most defensible naval position in the islands. Following the 
def eat of the Spanish navy in the Caribbean the threat was almost 
totally negated and there was no need for a withdrawal. 3 
Follo.ving the start of the armistice, the Naval War Board in its 
final official report, written by Mahan, pondered the future of the 
Philippines and the American role there, specifically in what capacity 
the U.S. Navy would serve. The report recorrmended the retention of 
either Manila or Subic :&ly in the event the United States kept any or 
all of the Philippines upon the conclusion of the peace negotiations in 
Paris. The report did not concern itself with the question of national 
policy regarding the annexation question, but rather the post war 
period and the need for naval bases in strategic points to permit the 
Navy to support any national interests deerned necessary by the 
goverrurent. In fact, on the day the armistice took effect, the 
department queried Dewey as to what he considered the best harbor for a 
naval base in the Philippines. Dewey replied that both Manila and 
Subic were suitable, with Subic the superior position. And in 
September, 1898, Oscar F. Williams, consul in .Ma.nila, telegramed 
Secretary of State John Hay to report that Subic was the best choice in 
the islands for a base and that Manila was "valueless." William R. 
Braisted noted soID2what incorrectly: 
Without constant supplying and without the haven at Manila, 
Dewey's ships could not have rerrained in the Far East without 
perishing. The war in the Pacific and the peace settlement 
were designed in large part to make certain that Arrerican 
forces would be assured ample shore facilities in the future. 
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Braisted's ccnment is soID2what incorrect because the war in the Pacific 
was in large part to cripple Spanish military capabilities and not to 
provide a naval tase. His ccnment is all the more surprising because 
of his pioneering work in the records of the navy covering that tiID2. 
Those records do not support a navy conspiracy to fight a war against 
Spain to gain a base in the Philippines. 
connected until 1 .May, 1898. 4 
The two actions were not 
The American search for bases in the Far East was matched by the 
Germans. Beginning secret talks with Spain at about the same time of 
the Paris peace negotiations, Gerniany bought from Spain, for $4.5 
million, the remaining colonial possessions not acquired by the United 
States. By Decerrber, 1898 the island group of the Carolines and the 
rerraining M3.rianas Islands (Guam was acquired by the United States, and 
had been the headquarters of the Spanish colonial government) were 
under effective Gerrran control, and soon became the focus of Arrerican 
naval fears. The war had hastened the annexation of the Hawaiian 
Islands (August, 1898), and along with the Philippines, provided a 
string of way stations from the American west coast and the Orient, 
part of M3.han's vision in which an isthmian canal would link the 
Atlantic coast with the Far East. The German control of the Carolines 
and M3.rianas meant that a foreign power straddled the sea lanes of 
corrmunication and supply between American outposts, theoretically 
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threatening interdiction of those sea lanes. This served to 
dem::mstrate the need for sea po~r (naval forces) and sea control 
(bases) in the Western Pacific, for although the German possessions 
were in the Central Pacific, any outbreak of hostilities between the 
two nations "v\Duld force the United States Navy to sortie though a 
gauntlet of possibly fortified positions to relieve pressure on the 
h 'l' . d 
5 P i ipp1nes an Guam. 
The search for the American Far East naval base involved two 
areas: (1) the coast of China and offshore positions, and (2) the 
Philippine Islands. The 1897 and 1898 attempts at a concession on the 
coast of China failed but the Navy was not dissuaded from further tries 
in the endeavor. Procuring help from the State Department, the Navy 
queried American consuls in various Chinese ports for information about 
facilities, tides, geography, trade, and the population so as to be 
able to determine which port would best serve American naval interest. 
This search would continue of and on until 1915 and ultimately would 
fail, in part because of Japanese hostility to the spread of Arrerican 
influence, and the concurrent sea power and sea control that would 
h 
. 6 accompany sue an expansion. 
Between January, 1899 and February, 1904 (the start of the 
Russo-Ja:pa.nese War) the following sites were examined by either 
American naval vessels or consular officials: San-Tu-Ao, Sam sah Bay, 
Tei Shei-shan, Ketsu Island, Chusan Islands, Nam Kwan, Canton, Nam Ki, 
Bullock Harbor, Kiachou, Long Beach, Murray Sound, St. Johns Harbor, 
West Harbor, .Makan Island, Ko Kuntan Islands, Sylvia Basin, Thornton 
Harbor, Hai Chu Bay, Tsu Sun Islands, Newchang, Tung Sung, Hung Wha, 
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Liu Kiu, Svvata..v, Wei-Hai-Wei and the Blonde Islands. In almost every 
case the position was either controlled by a third party, or a veto was 
exercised by a third party, or the position was unsuitable. 7 
The issuance of the "Open Door" notes in September, 1899 and July, 
1900 by the United States eventually put the State Department, and 
Secretary Hay, in an embarrassing position as Hay was the leading 
advocate of maintaining the territorial integrity of the Chinese 
Empire, not so much for China's interest but for the maintenance of 
American camrercial interests. Hay was discanforted by his request to 
the Japanese for their approval in acquiring a naval base in the Fukien 
province area, which by an earlier (1898) non-alienation agreement 
between China and Japan was under the latter's realm of influence. The 
Japanese response to Hay was an errphatic negative, and pointed out the 
hyr;x>crisy of Hay's request in light of his advocacy for the integrity 
of China. This was the first and last attempt by Hay to intercede on 
the Navy's behalf in the search for bases, al though the Navy would 
continue to ask for State Department assistance in the search. 8 
The search for a major base in the Philippines v..Duld continue from 
the years 1898 to 1922 and would never be satisfactorily solved, for a 
variety of reasons, from appropriations to international and 
intraservice bickering. Dewey had reported in August, 1898 that Subic 
Bay vvas the best and strongest r;x>int for a base in the Philippines, and 
that was the earliest known assessment of the bay during the search for 
a location by the United States. Because of the Philippine 
insurrection the Navy did not take actual control of the bay until 
September, 1899, although it had sent vessel there on at least three 
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occasions. The first was on 30 April, 1898 when Dewey reconnoitered 
the bay, searching for Admiral Montojo's forces prior to the American 
descent upon .Manila. The second visit was on 7 July, 1898 when !Ewey 
sent two of his ships to Subic on a bcxnbardment mission at Grande 
Island, which guarded the mouth of the bay and was the last rermining 
Spanish outpost in the area. A German vessel had evacuated the 
non-combatants (warren and children) off of the island and was rret at 
the entrance by the American vessels. This was reported by Dewey to 
his superiors as an attempt by the Genuans to "interfere" with the 
conduct of the war, an example of misrepresentation of German actions, 
because although there was no requirerrent to do so the Germans rrerely 
perforrred a humanitarian act. This was just another episode in the 
hostile German-Arrerican relationship at Manila, which v..Duld bias !Ewey 
for years. The last visit by the United States prior to effective 
occur::a.tion took place in .March, 1899 with a naval vessel checking on 
the extent of rebel activity in the bay. 9 
The first detailed survey of sites in the Philippines, in regard 
to the naval base question was, was canpleted in Fall 1899, by 
Lieutenant John M. Ellicott from the Office of Naval Intelligence. 
Normally billeted onboard the U.S.S. Baltirrore, for this survey he took 
corrmand of a small craft and set out to visit the potential sites for a 
naval base. His canpleted report would provide arrmunition for the 
future anti-SUbic Bay opponents, for Ellicott wrote that a thorough 
search should be made before a site was selected, and that he 
considered Manila Bay "the least fit place that I have seen" placing 
Subic in the same category. He made the assessment based on the lack 
68 
of natural defensible positions in either, the scarcity of docking 
facilities, and shoal waters. Ellicott suggested additional sites be 
examined but his strongest recanmendation was reserved for the harbor 
of Ilo-Ilo on Panay Island, 300 miles south of Manila. The position 
had "tactical topographical characteristics which are almost ideal" and 
two deep channels to open water with the mouth of the harbor masked by 
a large island. The position would have required little improvement 
(according to Ellicott) and attacking forces would have to have a fleet 
twice as large as the defenders possessed. 10 
The Ellicott report was taken into consideration by the Off ice of 
Naval Intelligence, and then in April, 1900, forwarded to the General 
Board of the Navy, a recently created (March, 1900) unofficial advisory 
body for the Secretary of the Navy. The bcXly was unofficial because it 
was never sanctioned by the Congress and served as a subordinate policy 
board with no power to enforce its recorrmendations. The President of 
the Board was Admiral George Dewey, who v..Duld rerrain in the position 
until his death in 1916. Much of the material for this work canes fran 
the records of the General Board and as such provides an excellent 
glimpse into the problems that challenged the Navy in the first quarter 
of the twentieth century. With regard to the Ellicott report, the 
General Board recomnended in June, 1900 that the department accept 
Ilo-Ilo as the location of the U.S. Navy's Far East naval station and 
called for a rapid development. The Board's desire for fast action was 
based on their perceived need for support facilities in the western 
Pacific as U.S. Navy warships still had to use the docks in Japan and 
Hong Kong to get repaired and refurbished. The additional factors of a 
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continuing China problem (the Boxers) and the Genra.n acquisition of the 
Spanish colonies in the Pacific sparked the Board's wish that a major 
naval presence be established in the Far East. That required a strong 
"modern fleet and a first class base" to support it. 11 
In October, 1900, Secretary Long, in no way obligated to accept 
any Board recommendations, appointed the Comnander-in-Chief of the 
Asiatic Station, and Dewey, s successor in that job, Rear Admiral George 
C. Raney, to chair a corrmission on the "Establishrrent of a Naval 
Station in the Philippine Islands." Following a cc:rnparative study of 
Ilo-Ilo and Subic the Rerrey Cc:rnmission report (January, 1901) 
recomnended the latter for development as a m:tjor base, declaring "that 
it was in all respects suitable for a naval station complete in all 
facilities for repair of vessels and assembling and storing supplies of 
all kind" and that Ilo-Ilo did not possess the advantages Subic did, 
primarily the ability to defend itself in the absence of the fleet. 
The cc:rnmission also wished to obtain whatever draft plans the Spanish 
had accumulated for the work already cc:rnpleted on Subic prior to 1 May, 
1898. A query through Secretary Hay brought the response that all of 
the r_::ertinent docurrents had been destroyed in May, 1898, following 
Dewey's destruction of the Spanish fleet at Manila. There has yet to 
be found a reasonable explanation as to the difference of opinion 
between the Ellicott Report and the Remey Corrrnission, in regard to 
SUbic Bay. Secretary Long, with great haste, prornptly submitted to the 
House Canrnittee on Naval Affairs an appropriations request for 
$1,000,000 to be included in the fiscal year 1902 budget. The money 
was to be sr_::ent on dredging, building piers and docks, and providing 
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storage for ccal stockpiles. The speed with which Long acted makes one 
suspect that the earlier support of Subic by Dewey and O.F. Williams, 
plus the arrount of work already canpleted by the Spanish in Subic 
persuaded him to approve the Remey Carrrnission reconmendation. 
Unfortunately, Congress was not in any haste to spend money on a 
facility so distant fran the continental United States, partly because 
creating a naval facility in a congressional district provided for 
votes but a facility in a territory (where there were no eligible 
voters) provided no incentives. After demurring on the appropriations 
request Congress ordered the establishment of yet another body to study 
locations for naval bases in the Philippines. Naval historians noted 
that fear regarding the lack of Congressional support: 
was based on a realistic assumption that the U.S. government 
policy makers were unlikely to support the whole dream [of 
worldwide naval bases] ... and that anything less than the 
whole dream would be a military nightrna.re. . . This assumption 
was realistic and [a] nightrna.re was the result. 
Of all our overseas bases only Cavite [in Manila Bay] received 
an appropriation of any significant arrount. Strangely enough 
this was done at a time when the Navy had definitely decided 
upon Olongapo in Subic Bay as our IPain Philippine Base [as 
well as the Far East] rather than the Manila Bay location. 
The whole question of battle-fleet support-especially the 
issue of bases-demonstrated the political limits to naval 
planning. In sum, the Navy had too many bases in the United 
States and too few abroad, but Congress regarded base[s] as 
attractive r:atronage. The "Navy, s search for bases abroad was 
frustrated by the ••. Congress which thought base buil~ing bad 
business [unless it was in a congressional district]. 
Notwithstanding a lack of Congressional support, the Navy 
continued with plans for building its major facility at Subic. The 
Department felt that it could continue preliminary work for Subic so 
that when funding was made available construction could begin 
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immediately. Throughout the rest of the year correspondence between 
various Navy officials seemed to carry an air of confidence, believing 
that their long sought for naval station in the Far East v-Duld be 
built, especially in view of the increasing tension in North China 
between the Russians and the Japanese. There was a concern that the 
outbreak of hostilities would find the Navy in the same position as it 
had been prior to 1 May, 1898, with no bases or secure strongpoints in 
the Far East. Confidence was so high in the belief of the ultimate 
establishment of a naval base that the General Board began to analyze 
the naval base facilities of the other pa.vers in Asia in preparation 
for prcrlucing war plans. The Board also began to prioritize its o.vn 
lists of desired points in Asia, with Subic, the Chusans and Guam 
listed as being of the first importance. 'Ihe Board also recorrmended 
the abandonment of the coal de:f:X)t held by the Navy in Yokohama, 
believing it useless in case of a war with Japan as an ally and 
untenable with Japan as an enemy. Between the date of Theodore 
Roosevelt's assumption of the presidency following McKinley's 
assassination (September, 1901) and the Spring of 1902, various boards 
and comnittees continued the work of preparation for Subic. Repeated 
pleas to Congress for additional appropriations for work at Subic went 
unheeded and the Department had to order a tanporary halt to work in 
progress. The only funding Congress would provide was for the 
construction of the flrating drydock "D2wey", intended to be used in 
the Philippines but not available for approximately two years. 13 
During the search for funding for a base in the Philippines the 
Navy continued its quest for an "advanced" position on the Chinese 
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coast or near periphery but repeatedly ran into difficulties, 
particularly when other powers were adamant that their "spheres of 
influence" would not be shared territorially with another party. The 
State Department also demurred in further assistance to the Navy, 
believing that a successful acquisition by the United States would lead 
to another scramble for Chinese territory. 14 
William R. Braisted noted that a significant problem in the Navy's 
desire for a major base in the Philippines was the lack of intraservice 
coordination between the Army and Navy leadership. From the start, the 
Navy's planning for Subic had failed to include any Army input, seeing 
the entire question as one of sea power. The Army questioned whether 
the Navy was the appropriate organization to handle coastal 
fortifications and shore defense. In January, 1902 the War Department 
complained to Roosevelt that the Navy was assuming additional duties 
not authorized or assigned to them. Deliberations between the two 
departments eventually led to an executive order by Roosevelt in 
November, 1902, providing for a joint defense of Subic. Ultirrately, 
the creation of the Joint Army and Navy Board in July, 1903, alleviated 
sane of the problems between the two services. Admiral Dewey was made 
the senior member of the Joint Board as well as remaining as the senior 
member of the General Board of the Navy. For its lifetime the Joint 
Board was never as pcwerful as the General Board, as a look through the 
records of the Joint Board will reveal that very little was actually 
accomplished as each service tended to pursue its own interests. This 
was probably a factor in the inability of the Na.vy to r;:ersuade Congress 
to appropriate funds for Subic in the Fiscal Year 1903 Budget. 15 
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It was the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and Russia in 
February, 1904 that prodded Congressional action and brought forth 
funding for a major naval facility to be based at Subic. The amount, 
$1,200,000, was far short of the $4,500,000 considered appropriate by 
the General Board. In any case Congress had at last made an effort to 
fund the building of Subic and the Navy could go ahead with its plans. 
But it was at this critical juncture that the confluence of three 
related events threatened to end the search for a base in the 
Philippines. The first was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the second was 
the Russo-Japanese War itself, and the third was the split between the 
Army and Navy over the Subic location. 16 
Tirpitz' "doctrine of risk" had forced Britain to reconsider its 
role vis-a-vis European pa.ver politics, and with the concentration of 
the German battlefleet in the North Sea, there was no recourse but to 
relinquish or degrade naval power in Asia so as to be able concentrate 
the Royal Navy in home waters. Doing so meant that the dominions and 
colonial territories would be stripped of available naval protection 
leaving them, especially India, subject to external pressure from not 
only Gennany but Russia as well. The search for a solution coincided 
with Japan's increasing proble:ns with Russian goals in China. At the 
end of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, Russia took the opJ:X>rtunity to 
effectively occupy all of J:'vlanchuria, threatening Northern China and 
Korea, an area of primary interest to Japan. After unsuccessful 
attempts by both Britain and Japan to flesh out their differences with 
Russia they came to view each other's aims as compatible. The two 
agreed to a bilateral arrangement, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 
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which served to free up assets of the Royal Navy so as to counter 
Gennan arrbitions in Europe. The agreement allovved Ja:i;:an to harden its 
position in negotiations with Russia over the latter's withdrawal from 
Manchuria. The main features of the alliance called for recognition of 
the territorial status quo tetween the signatories and required that if 
one party was involved in a war with a third party, the second would 
renB.in neutral, unless a fourth power threatened to, or did, intervene. 
Significantly the alliance was designed to counter Russian movement in 
Asia, but sorre Arrerican planners could interpret it as also airred at 
the United States, while others had worried that any reconciliation 
tetween Russia and Ja:r;:an would leave Ja:i;:an free to turn its attention 
south, towards the defenseless Philippines. For the most part the 
signing of the agreement brought relief not only to Tokyo and London, 
but to Washington as well. Any moves taken to quell irmnediate 
hostilities protected American ccrmrercial interests in Asia as well as 
provided time to build a powerful naval base in the Philippines. There 
is no indication in official Japanese records of contemplated moves 
against the Philippines and points south during that time but the lack 
of a base caused concerns for naval planners, who foresaw that an 
expanded theater of operation for the conduct of the war might involve 
violations of the neutrality of American territory in the Western 
Pacific. Roosevelt, not particularly fond of Germany at the tirre, was 
concerned with the extent of their activity in Europe and their 
ambitions in the Caribbean, taking into account previous diplanatic 
difficulties in Samoa, Manila Bay, the Spanish colonial possessions, 
the China scramble, the Danish West Indies, Venezuela, and Santo 
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Domingo (the Dcrninican Republic). Roosevelt also saw the unfettered 
moverrents of Russia in Asia as a definite threat to American interests 
and r;:erceived that a balance of pow=r in Asia was possible as long as 
no paver was thoroughly deprived of the ability to project power, an 
act which v.;ould cause obvious concern to Roosevelt and discomfort to 
the American forces in the Philippines. 17 
The opening of hostilities by Jap:i.n in February, 1904 was carried 
out with a sneak attack on surface forces anchored at the major Russian 
naval facility in the Far East, Port Arthur, and was viewed by both 
Roosevelt and Mahan with sane pleasure. Russia, in conjunction with 
Gennany and France, had forced Jap:i.n to retrocede Port Arthur to China 
in April,1895 and then grabbed the strategic harbor for itself in 
March, 1898, thus earning the enmity of Jap:i.n,and of Britain. Am2rican 
naval planners began to worry over the conduct of the war, for while 
rraintaining neutrality the Navy had to protect Arrerican canrrerce 
crossing the Pacific to Asia, and the possible expansion of the theater 
of or;:erations v.;ould rrean possible American involvement, p:i.rticularly to 
avoid violations of territorial waters in the Philippines. The 
rapidity with which Jap:i.n began to assault Russian positions caused 
concern arrong American planners, as the destruction of Russian naval 
pow=r at Port Arthur and the extended siege of the harbor by the 
Jap:i.nese vividly demonstrated to them the shortcanings in the defense 
of the Philippines. By late October, 1904 the Russians had decided to 
deploy the Baltic Fleet 12,000 nautical miles to the Far East, with the 
hope that the arrival of that force v.;ould tip the balance in Russia's 
favor. The fall of Port Arthur in January, 1905 meant that upon its 
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arrival that Russian fleet would have possess no base in near 
proximity, having to go into battle upon its arrival in a horrendous 
condition, with fouled hulls, low coal levels, exhausted crews and no 
hope for a respite. The destruction of the Baltic Fleet at the May, 
1905 Battle of Tsushirna Straits ended Russian naval pov.A2r in Asia for 
decades. The Russian violations of sea power principles were quite 
vivid. They had divided up their fleet units, thus depriving 
themselves of concentrated strength. The failure of Port Arthur to 
withstand the siege and falling tefore the arrival of the Baltic Fleet 
also served to concern American planners. 
was that the Phili:ppines were in no way 
The biggest 
ready to be 
lesson learned 
defended. The 
Philippines were over 7,000 miles fran the continental United States, 
there was no base in the islands, the fleet was divided into several 
components with a large part of it in the Atlantic. The ability of 
Japa.n to use shorter lines of canmunications as well as a large 
merchant marine meant that her forces could occupy positions in the 
W2stern Pacific well before a threatened power could react. Japa.n 
could move against the Philippines in a week with at least 100,000 
fully arrred men while the United States, would have to assemble its 
forces then sail a great distance, in this case around the tip of South 
America (the Panama canal was opened in 1914) finally reaching the 
Western Pacific 90 days after the outbreak of hostilities. That was 
predicated upon there being a naval base in the Philippines that could 
hold out for that amount of time, but as derronstrated in the 
Russo-Japa.nese War, the probable use of high-pov.A2red artillery and 
18 mortars would be the reason for an Army challenge to the naval base. 
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As Roosevelt (as well as Britain and Ge:r:many) watched the slow 
destruction of Russian capabilities, the balance of po.ver was 
definitely swinging toward Japan's favor, with the concurrent 
international prestige, increased domestic (and inflamed) nationalism, 
all sorrewhat unanticipated and with consequences not yet evident in 
western capitals. While Roosevelt had hoped that the two belligerents 
v.Duld wear themselves dcwn and maintain the balance of power in Asia, 
the ineptitude of the Russian military system, coupled with rising 
dissent at hane only served to insure that Japan would achieve 
tremendous victories on the battlefield. The day to day advances by 
Ja:i;:an in the Far East 
first Asian nation 
brought concern to the west, as Ja:i;:an was 
to defeat a white nation in canbat. 
the 
The 
implications could not be overlooked, as Roosevelt understood that 
following the end of the war Japan would be in strong position to carry 
out almost any policy that her national interests called for. The 
concern for post-war developments, as they concerned the United States 
in Asia, drove Roosevelt to try, from the beginning, to bring the 
combatants together. Failing this he then attempted to mediate their 
differences. It was only after the destruction of the Baltic Fleet in 
May, 1905 that both nations were arrenable to discussing an errl to the 
war. Ja:i;:an had almost exhausted her forces and rrateriel in the land 
battles against Russian strongholds in Manchuria, while suffering 
economic difficulties at home. The Russians faced not only battle 
field defeats but revolt at hane, and thus both nations agreed to meet 
with Roosevelt at Portsmouth, New Hampshire in the sumrrer of 1905. The 
result was the Treaty of Portsmouth in September, 1905 in which the 
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strong international position of Japan was reco:::rnized, awarded most of 
her demands, which consisted of the cession of Port Arthur to Japan, 
and half of Sakhalin Island, reco:::rnition of Japanese prirracy in the 
Korean peninsula, Russian withdrawal of her forces from Manchuria and 
of major naval forces from the eastern coast of China. In spite of 
their victory the Japanese were angry at Roosevelt because he had 
intervened to see that Japan failed to gain all of Sakhalin Island, and 
to prevent the payment of an indemnity from Russia. Roosevelt used his 
influence to persuade the Japanese delegation to accept those two 
concessions because he did not want to back Russia into a corner, or 
into a resumption of hostilities. Roosevelt had an additional reason 
for not wanting Japan to receive an indemnity. 'Any monies received by 
Japan v.;ould most probably be used to finance her military forces and 
naval shipbuilding, sanething that had occurred earlier when Japan used 
indemnities gained from China (1895) to build up her naval strength. 
In his view that kind of post-war activity by Japan had to be 
·ad 19 avo1 e . 
The Navy's perception of Japanese victories was that now a 
potential and strong enemy was near at hand. This was an enemy that 
not only had a powerful navy but an enemy that possessed the ability to 
transport land forces in a rapid and efficient manner, possessing a 
considerable merchant marine able to support mission requirements. To 
those assets this enemy added the considerable advantage of possessing 
strong naval bases throughout the theater of operations (the western 
Pacific), and of being in close proximity to her interests, unlike the 
United States whose interests in the Far Fast were over 7000 nautical 
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miles from her west coast. These factors played a role in the Army's 
decision to dispute the location of the naval base in the Philippines. 
The Army had never wholeheartedly supported the Subic decision, and 
with the Japanese advances against the Russians at Port Arthur, and the 
similar geo:Jraphic and topajraphic characteristics of the American and 
Russian base locations, the Army liked it even less. Although the 
services had earlier agreed upon Subic as the location for the main 
American naval base in the Far Fast the war itself caused a split among 
senior officials and this was in part the reason for the eventual 
failure of the Navy's search for the Far Fast naval base. The first 
visible sign of a split came in a personal letter in June, 1904 to 
Roosevelt by Major-General Leonard Wood, previously the President's 
physician and Spanish-American war camnanding officer now stationed in 
the southern Philippines. Wood's letter appealed to Roosevelt to move 
the l::ase from Subic to Manila Bay as the forrrer was indefensible while 
the latter was the canrrercial, political and strategic center of the 
islands. The General was afraid that the U.S. Navy V1Duld be bottled up 
in Subic as had happened to the Russian forces in Port Arthur. He 
further recommended that the United States fortify Manila Bay with an 
increased nwnber of shore batteries. Wood was joined in this dissent 
by the camrander of the American Philippine squadron, Rear Admiral 
William Folger, who suggested that the U.S. Navy could serve as an 
adjunct to the shore defenses in Manila Bay. Roosevelt referred the 
matter to the General Board, whose response was that the SUbic Bay 
location was sound, could be easily defended with American assets in 
the Philippines supported by a deployrrent of the United States Navy 
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from the west coast, and that the use of naval assets as support for 
fixed shore defenses was an absurd mission for a navy. Roosevelt 
inforrred WOJd (and the Navy inforrred Folger) that the General Board's 
reasoning was impressive, and that he would stick with Subic as the 
location of the American base in the Far East. While both officers 
were obliged to obey the directives of their su:i;::eriors they inforrred 
them that they still considered Subic to be a trap. Wood's objections 
were in part based on the Navy decision to use Marines as the shore 
defense forces in Subic instead of regular Army troops, thus 
"offending" the sensibilities of Wood. The Navy argued further that it 
cx:>uld effectively protect Manila B::ly from Subic Bay, and that the loss 
of Manila would not in itself mean the loss of the entire archipelago, 
in contrast to the American argument in 1898 that De\~y's capture of 
Manila Bay meant the effective occupation of the Philippines and the 
end of Spanish authority. Wood continued to agitate the situation 
eventually involving the Secretary of War William Taft, previously the 
Governor-General of the Philippines. 'Ihe intervention \.\TOrked because 
Congress deferred any more funding for Subic until a final arrl ultimate 
decision could be made on the location of the base. 20 
The outcane of the war eventually served effectively to end the 
Navy's dream for Subic. Moreover after span of three years the 
question was reo:i;::ened for debate and reconsideration. The result was a 
series of acrimonious exchanges between the services, a presidential 
rebuke to the services for the embarrassment it caused ROJsevelt who 
had been the leading advocate of funding for Subic in repeated 
ap:i;::earances before Congress, where he stated that senior officers of 
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both services were as one in proposing Subic. By January, 1908 the 
final decision was made that Manila Bay would be the main base in the 
Y€stern Pacific, in part because of the Russian experience at Port 
Arthur, but Congress for whatever reasons chose to defer funding the 
developuent of the base as the services lMJUld have liked. 
Additionally, the Navy decided tha.t it would prefer to have its largest 
major facilities at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. In this the President, and 
the Army, concurred and appealed to the Congress for funds to build 
facilities there. Congress, more amenable to a less distant location, 
still took its time in funding the base at Pearl Harbor and it was not 
until 1919 that the Navy could truly claim that it had a major base 
outside of the continental United States. 21 
JAPAN AS THE ENEMY 
The post war period in the Pacific brought about a realignment of 
power, with the Russians excluded from the Western Pacific, Germany and 
Britain engaged in increasing hostilities in European waters, and Ja[B.n 
emerging as the major power in the Far East. This errergence was to 
cause American planners difficulties, as there appeared to be no power 
in the East that could stop a determined Japan from continuing a 
program of expansion, peaceful or otherwise. The outbreak of war 
between Russia and Ja[B.n forced military planners into adding Japan to 
the possible "enemies" list, joining Germany and a thoroughly defeated 
Russia. Up to 1905 naval policy makers had viewed Germany as the more 
potentially dangerous opponent because of her banbastic Kaiser, a large 
deep water navy, and expansionist desires. Naval planners postulated 
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the probability of hostilities with Gennany, due to violations of the 
"Monroe Doctrine" triggered by possible Gennan expansion into the 
caribbean, Central and South Arrerica. The fear of such activity by 
Germany was, in part, the creation of Dewey, Mahan and Roosevelt. 
There v.;ere sane planning studies by the Gerrran General Staff that 
called for moves against the east coast of the United States and 
seizures of strategic points in the caribbean, but only in the case of 
open hostilities. There is no evidence that these were first strike 
plans, only offensive contingencies, that v.;ere abandoned after 1906. 
This was caused by the realignment of power in the Far East, as a 
defeated Russia posed no open threat to Britain, and Britain was able 
to keep the majority of her fleet in hane waters. The Anglo-Japa.nese 
Alliance was renev.;ed in the spring of 1905, before the Portsrrouth 
Conference, thus ensuring that Japa.n was given further protection in 
the conduct of war against intervention by third parties, leaving Japan 
as the protector of the East and relieving Britain of responsibilities 
the . 22 in region. 
The United States began to study Japa.n as a potential opponent 
after the start of the Russo-Japanese W:tr in February, 1904. It was the 
rapid advances and significant Japa.nese victories that did much to 
alarm American military rren (and one of the reasons for the eventual 
decision to forego Subic as the Far East naval station), but it was not 
until the surnrrer of 1906 that serious war planning was instituted. 
This was not caused by any presidential order or by an international 
crises, rather by dorrestic policies that "threatened" to escalate into 
warfare, or so the planners, politicians, and the President, thought. 
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The ef feet of victory in the Russo-,Japanese War did much to increase 
the nationalistic emotions of the Japanese, the defeat of a white 
nation by an Oriental nation not easy to overlook. Friction between 
the United States and Jap:ln occurred following the devastating San 
Francisco earthquake of April, 1906. Long held racial prejudices, 
labor tensions and general discrimination against hard working, low 
p:lid Oriental workers spilled into acrimony, with attacks upon Japanese 
nationals living in the state of california. Exhausted by the 
Russo-Jap:lnese War Jap:ln could do very little, but eventually the 
situation in California cooled dcwn. By the surrmer of 1906 the 
californians had again inflarred p:issions to such a point that the 
military, and Roosevelt, envisioned that war might break out. The 
episode was caused by inflamrratory editorials printed in a San 
Francisco newspaper, brutally insulting, regarding the work habits of 
Jap:lnese workers, follo~d in October, 1905 by a legislative act in the 
city that called for racial segregation of Oriental students, 
sui;:pcsedly because they were unable to assimilate into Arrerican 
society, and they had unusual traits, such as thrift and language. The 
ef feet in Jap:ln was immediate, with anti-Arrerican riots breaking out 
Tokyo. Roosevelt was unaware of the situation until inforrred by 
consular officials in Jap:ln that the legislation was a point of 
contention, especially in view of the fact that the Japanese blarred 
Roosevelt for the failure of the Japanese delegation to receive any 
indemnity fran Russia. Added to this was the increased nationalism 
brought about by the shocking defeat of Russia, and the 
reaction in Jap:ln was understandable. 23 
unhappy 
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But it was not the outbreak of the riots in October that caused 
the navy to begin to consider serious war plans for dealing with Japan. 
It was a canbination of the defeat of Russia, suspicion of Japanese 
ambitions in Asia, the arrogant behavior of Japanese officials toward 
foreigners in Manchuria, and the reaction to mistreatrrent of Japanese 
in California after the San Francisco earthquake, that the Naval War 
College assigned a problem to its students in the 1906 sumrrer session. 
The problem was based on the possibility of hostilities between the 
United States and Japan. The result of the class work was canpiled and 
suhnitted to the General Board for c0ITim2nt, revision and approval. 
This scenario had also occurred in 1894 when the War College 
accomplished the same task regarding possible hostilities between the 
United States and Spain over Cuba. The General Board used the student 
problems and solutions to cone up with a tentative plan in September, 
1906. Entitled "In case of Strained Relations with Japan", the General 
Board docurrent envisioned offensive operations against the Japanese in 
the Far East. The plan called for the Arrerican fleet to assemble in 
Atlantic waters, then sail to the East. The whole scenario was seen as 
one of a naval conflict with a blockade of Japan leading to an Arrerican 
victory. The plan was too simple, as there was no base in the Far East 
capable of sustaining prolonged operations in Japan. The Philippines 
limited military forces were expected to hold out until the navy came 
to the rescue but in light of the vivid Japanese offensive capabilities 
against Port Arthur, it was certain that the islands would fall. 24 
It was at this point that Roosevelt asked the Navy atout the 
status of preparations for war against Japan, to which the General 
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Board replied that it possessed a "plan" that would provide for the 
concentration of American naval strength in the Far East within ninety 
days of the outbreak of war. Fortunately Roosevelt did not have to 
depend on the use of military force to bring about a resolution of the 
problem. He used diplcrnacy instead to placate the Japanese. A 
"Gentlemen's Agreement" limiting Jap::tnese irrmigration to the 
continental United States was signed by the two nations, and San 
Francisco softened its offensive legislation. Existing records do not 
reveal any proof of Japan's intention to go to war over the 
mistreatment of Jap:mese in America; but the talk of war appears to 
have originated with Roosevelt. He invited a delegation of 
representatives from California to the White House, and explained to 
them that the nation was not in such a strong position to participate 
in a war with Jap::tn, and that their careless and thoughtless actions 
had the possibility of embroiling the United States in hostilities. 
The delegation returned to California, impressed by Roosevelt's 
reasoning, but not before newsp::tpers published the subject of the White 
House discussion. A war scare hysteria began with many citizens now 
fearful of the "Yellow Peril", and forced the military to consider the 
possiblity of hostilities. 25 
Roosevelt had succeeded in quietening the situation but was now 
intrigued by the possibility of a war with the Japanese. He did not 
actively desire to go to war; he only wanted to determine the readiness 
of the Navy to handle such an occurrence. Roosevelt was still more 
suspicious of German intentions, and wanted to maintain peaceful 
relations with Japan. He decided in late 1907 to test the fleet by 
' 
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sending a large force of available battleships (16) on a 
round-the-world cruise, to show the flag, to let the Japanese know that 
the Pacific was not a closed ocean, and to test the combat readiness of 
the fleet. Departing in October of 1908, the force headed toward 
Brazil, plagued by reports that the Japanese were planning to ambush 
the ships enroute Rio de Janeiro, and destroy the remnants in the 
central Pacific. Naval Attaches in Europe traced the origins of the 
rUITDrs to German sources, reinforcing Roosevelt's imagery of Germany as 
26 an enemy. 
The force safely made it to South America and assembled off of the 
california coast for training and re-supply. There v-.ere calls for the 
retention of the fleet in Pacific waters, for fear of Japan still 
permeated the minds of many Californians, but Roosevelt decided to 
continue the circurrmavigation of the globe with the fleet, much to the 
concern of Congress, fearful of losing the only protection against 
invasion by determined fees. The fleet worked its way across the 
Pacific, visiting Hawaii, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, 
Japan and China before heading back to the United States via the Suez 
canal. The stops in Australia and New Zealand served to alleviate 
concerns of waves of Japanese heading in a southernly direction. Both 
dominions had voiced concerns over the renewing of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance as ""White Australia" and ""White New Zealand" did not wish to 
accept increased numbers of Japanese imnigrants. The alliance between 
the mother country and the Far Fast nemesis left them feeling rather 
naked. The United States appeared to be the only savior they could 
count on in the Pacific. Roosevelt, not anxious to go to war with 
''\ 
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Japan, could only smile in response to the outbreak of anti-Japanese 
violence in British Columbia, derronstrating to the Ja:panese that racism 
was not endemic to the United States but the English daninions as well. 
The visit to Japan was a success, with no undue incidents occurring to 
fillr the harmonious atmosphere. A diplanatic struggle of sorts occurred 
when the Japanese tried to persuade Roosevelt to cancel the fleet visit 
to China, to avoid difficulties, following recent anti-American riots 
against American policy regarding tariffs and irrmigration. Roosevelt 
also perceived that China wished to use the visit as a ploy to gain 
international acceptance of her stature, and to bring pressure on Ja:i;:an 
to cease her economic penetrations of China. As a canpromise, the 
fleet visit was dropped and a smaller squadron visit was scheduled, 
pleasing Japan more than China. The only way that Roosevelt was going 
to get involved in a war over China was if American interests were 
directly threatened, and then only if the fleet was strong. 27 
That concern was one reason for the cruise of the "Great White 
Fleet." The ability to respond to crisis situations was dependent on 
naval force. The lack of a naval ba.se in the Far East was a conspicous 
missing asset. When the fleet visited the Philippines, facilities were 
far and few to be found. Voyage repairs had to be accanplished 
haphazardly and steam engines suffered fran manufacturer defects or 
fillintenance deficiencies. On top of this the Roosevelt administration 
had to face another battle. Congress had not only failed to fund a 
ba.se in the Philippines, but had not been persuaded to increase the 
size the Navy at a faster pace. Led by peace adherents, a concern was 
raised that navies (using Mahan principles) v.Duld only lead to armed 
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conflict, thus Congress w::iuld not strongly support a deep water navy, 
depending more on shore fortifications and coastal battleships to 
protect the shores of America. While Roosevelt and the military 
thought of wars being fought in distant theaters, Congress thought of 
hostilities happening nearer the Arrerican coastline. Long range 
warfare concepts based on errerging technology and strategic principles 
~re just beginning to be developed, and the disastrous attempt by 
Russia to project her naval power at Tsushima, even though the attempt 
was made near contiguous territory, made the Congress wary of 
supporting what they considered a policy of folly. Congress went so 
far as to threaten a cutoff of funds halfway through the round the 
world cruise, but Roosevelt's wonderful threat of unfavorable publicity 
w::irked to persuade Congress to continue funding. "Congress let your 
boys rot overseas" would not have been a popular refrain, especially in 
the election year of 1908. 28 
Regardless of Roosevelt's reasons, the trip was not without 
rewards, or lessons learned. The first lesson was that the United 
States merchant fleet was terribly obsolete and could not service the 
navy at all. Colliers, tenders, and repairs ships had to be leased or 
rented along the route of the journey, providing visual proof of the 
need for a strong national naritime service able to support fleet 
missions throughout the world. The most important lessons learned 
proved to be almost fatal to the argument of the need for a Far East 
naval base. The condition of the fleet and its canbat readiness did 
not suffer from fatal wear and tear, and the previously predicted 
ninety day voyage across the Pacific was no.v seen as possible to be 
I 
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accomplished in sixty days. The need for a ba.se was predicated on the 
condition of the fleet arriving in the Western Pacific after a 
contested voyage of three rronths. Lessons learned good and ba.d served 
to point out defects in the system and the "uselessness" of a large and 
expensive ba.se in Asia. In addition Roosevelt had managed to acquire 
agreements with Jap::ln that supposedly preserved the status quo. In 
July, 1905, shortly tefore the Portsrrouth Conference started, Secretary 
of War William Taft made a visit to the Far East and while in Jap::ln 
completed a "Memorandum of Agreement", the Taft-Katsura conversations, 
in which Roosevelt recognized Jap::lnese predominance over Korea as a 
result of the Russo-Jap::lnese War. It was later touted by Japanese 
newsp::lpers, after leaks by unnamed Japanese officials, that the United 
States had agreed to a protectorate of Korea by Jap::ln in exchange for a 
Jap::lnese pledge not to move against the Philippine Islands. Roosevelt 
tartly noted that the agreement was not such an arrangement, while 
correctly noting that Japanese pledges not to move against the 
Philippines ~re a promise not to make war against the United States, 
sorrething which Roosevelt felt was a superfluous issue, in light of 
. k k . h" d . 29 previous Japanese snea attac s against C ina an Russia. 
The increased hostility to Germany after the spreading of the 
rurrors during the course of the world cruise, forced Roosevelt 
seriously to contemplate potential Gerrran military action in the 
Atlantic. Any hostilities between Germany and Britain that ended in a 
Gerrran victory threatened American interests not only in the Atlantic 
but in exposed positions around the world. Roosevelt recognized that 
only Britain's Royal Navy stopped the Kaiser from carrying out his 
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ambitions. The cruise served to provide a political arrangement with 
Japan in November, 1908. The Root-Takahira agreement recognized the 
territorial status quo of each power in the Pacific. Noticeably 
missing was any statement about maintaining the territorial integrity 
of the unstable Chinese Empire. The agreement allowed Roosevelt to 
withdraw major fleet units from the Pacific and reposition them in the 
Atlantic, where they would send a diplanatic sign of support to 
Britain, as well as a sign of displeasure to Germany. Following the 
arrival of the fleet in the United States (February, 1909), and shortly 
before Rcosevelt was succeeded by William Taft, relations between Jap:i.n 
and the United States v.ere rather cordial with most of the racial 
difficulties in the background. Though there was peace between the two 
nations, the Navy was continuing work on an acceptable war plan in case 
of future turmoil with Jap:i.n. Following the 1906 immigration crisis 
and war scare, the Navy attempted to find a plan that v.ould maximize 
its limited resources while preventing "Orange", as Jap:i.n came to be 
called in war plans, from carrying out any successful execution of 
offensive operations in the Far East, and particularly the Philippines. 
The lack of a major naval facility in the w=stern Pacific would 
continue to plague the U.S. Navy, as every study required that the 
United States would have to maintain prolonged on station time in 
blockading Jap:i.n. That would require the regular upkeep, repair and 
re-supply of those vessels, but no creditable answer was found. The 
island of Guam, only 1500 nautical miles fran Manila, was then put 
forward by the Navy, and .Mcl.han, as the most important strategic point 
near the Western Pacific as it ccrnma.nded major shipping sea lanes to 
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the Far East, as wel 1 as routes that ran :tetween Japan and the Indian 
Ocean. The base funding issue was never adequately solved and the 
problem continued. 30 
Another outbreak of racial tensions occurred in california in 
1911, over perceived violations of the 1907 "Gentlenen 's Agreement." 
Japanese nationals were restricted in caning from Japan directly to the 
United States, but received generous rights for artist and student 
visas. The problem arose over the increase of non-students and 
non-artists corning into the continental United States. Renewed 
diplanatic conversations brought the issue to a peaceful conclusion, 
but a war hysteria swept the general population, as v.ould occurr again 
in 1913, following another outbreak of racial troubles in California. 
Throughout this period there exists no proof of Japanese intention to 
go to war with the United States, but the hysteria persuaded many that 
war was imminent. The second renewa 1 of the Ang lo-Japanese Alliance in 
1911 was seen American planners as an attempt by Japan to forestall 
British intervention in a war :tetween the United States and Japan. But 
the two parties had substantial reasons in renewing the alliance, for 
Britain was in a naval race with Gernany, and Japan was attempting to 
strengthen her position in China, not trying to divide the Anglo-Saxon 
nations. Japan also wished to increase immigration to the white 
dominions of Australia am New Zealand by the renewal of the agreement 
with Britain. This failed to achieve the goal, as the two dominions 
argued they should not be bound by irrmigration agreements without their 
consent. Australia and New Zealand now :tegan to feel alone and 











Royal naval protection in the Pacific, leaving Jap:i.n as the defender of 
British interests. The United States was seen as the only friend in 
the region, thus the two daninions ""2re not enthusiastic arout the 
second renewal. By the beginning of World War I, the British fleet, 
for all intents and purposes was in Euror:x=an waters and the first 
question was what would Jap:i.n do, for she was not yet a party to the 
31 Euror:x=an war. 
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CHAPTER IV 
W.W. I AND THE WESTERN PACIFIC, 1914-1922 
STRATEGIC PROBLEMS, 1914-1919 
Observers viewed a World War as unexpected. The outbreak of an 
Austro-Serbian conflict had been likely but the expanded European war 
was a surprise to nearly everyone. The concern of Arrerican planners 
was on avoiding getting dragged into the war, for the nation was going 
to maintain its neutrality in what was not originally considered an 
expanded theater of operations conflict. Recalling that it was called 
World War I much later, the expectation of global warfare was just 
beginning to develop in military men. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance had 
originally been created to comba.t an imbalance Britain suffered in the 
unlimited worldwide responsibilities imposed on her naval po;.ver. The 
alliance allowed Britain to withdraw most of her naval units to 
Euro_l;Ean waters in response to the increased naval 
programs of Gennany, which had concentrated her forces 
ship building 
in the t:iorth 
Sea. Japan benefited fran the alliance, gaining a strong naval power 
as her ally, and the recognition of her position in East Asia. This 
was one problem that was to plague American naval authorities. What 
w::iuld Japan do in case of a war between Germany and Britain? V\buld 
Japan remain neutral or would she join the war? The alliance obligated 
Japan to assist Britain in case of difficulties in Asia, not Europe or 
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the Pacific. Gennany possessed only one colony on the Asian nainland, 
Kiachou on the Shantung Peninsula and she possessed territories in the 
Central Pacific, canprised of the Marshalls, the carolines and 
Marianas, the last two bought fran Spain in Decerrber, 1898.
1 
Arrerican leadership tried to forestall the spread of hostilities 
to Asia with attempts at neutralizing the area, receiving vague 
responses from Britain, and a more positive answer from Gernany. The 
concern over the spread of the war to the Far East was based on the 
threat to corrmercial interests in the region, for the United States 
would renain neutral, and the belligerents would attempt to interdict 
the cornnerce of their opponents, and thus probably interfere with 
American shipping. Britain was notorious for adding items to 
contraband lists after wars had begun, and the United States wished to 
continue selling goods to all parties, with no intention of providing 
contraband, previously listed as such tefore the outbreak of war. 
Another concern was the possible participation of Japan in the war. A 
role for her would mean difficulty, because by default she would become 
the strongest belligerent in Asia, with no power in position to 
restrain her ambitions. China was seen as the most probable victim of 
Japanese participation in the war. 2 
The concern over Japanese entry into the war was realized in late 
August, 1914 when Britain was unable to effectively protect her 
shipping, colonies, and sea lanes of canmunication between Asia and the 
European theater of operations. Britain had drafted Australians and 
New Zealanders for duty in Europe and their convoys had to be 
protected. Thus limited assets had to be re-positioned, reducing 
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mission capabilities. Gennan units in Asia \"'2re negligible but strong 





stripped of their protective naval 
informed Japan that the tenns 
units. 
of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance \l\Duld not be invoked as this was a European 
conflict, and that British interests in Asia would not be disturbed. 
With the fears over the activities of the Gerrran naval forces in the 
Pacific, and demands for protection by the daninions, Britain was 
forced to reconsider her position and request Japanese assistance. 
This request was tempered with a geographic limitation, calling for 
Japan to restrict her operations to the China Seas. Japan acceded to 
the request for assistance but disdained any restrictions on the scope 
of her activities, or her freedom of action. Japan issued an ultirratum 
to Germany in early August 1914, calling for the unconditional 
surrender of Kiaochou to Japan, with the view to the eventual 
restoration of the territory to China. The note made no mention of 
Gennan islands in the Pacific, but Britain had already made plans for 
the capture of the islands, using Australians and New Zealanders. 
Germany failed to respond to the ultirratum and Japan declared that 
hostilities existed between the two nations, because of the danger to 
the peace of the Far Fast that continued German occupation of the 
Shantung Peninsula posed, the same langauge used by the Germans to 
Jap:tn in 1895, following the Tripartite Intervention, stripping Japan 
of the strategic harbor of Port Arthur. The humiliating experience was 
now repaid, with Germany the target. Japanese forces, with a small 
detachment of English troops (only taken along at the insistence of the 
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British government), moved against the Germans at Kiaochou, but not 
directly. Using the excuse of military necessity, Japan violated 
China's neutrality by invading a position over 100 miles away from 
Kiaochou. The force captured a railhead running between Tsingtao and 
Tsinan-fu, with Japan responding to Chinese protests that the rail-line 
was a legitinate target. China did not agree on that point, but Jar:an 
ignored the protests and continued the assault, corrpleted the task in 
3 Noverrber, 1914. 
The acquisition of the German Pacific islands brought Jar:an deeper 
into the Pacific Ocean. Australia and New Zealand failed to proceed 
rapidly in earlier opportunities to capture the islands themselves, 
either through fear of Gerrran raiders in the area, or through a lack of 
haste to move into the territories. The continued threat of German 
naval activity and the slowness of corrmonwealth forces provided the 
excuse for the Jar:anese occupation of the islands north of the equator, 
while the islands south of the equator had already been taken within 
weeks of the declaration of war. Mistakes by the dominions included 
believing that occupation of the Gerrran half of New Guinea gave them 
effective control of the islands north of the equator. Britain had 
also asked Japan to provide assistance in containing the operating area 
of the German vessels, which Japan took as a blank check to move 
against those islands not already under British control. By the end of 
October 1914 all German territory in the Pacific was under the 
occur:ation of one or the other of the belligerents, and Japan began to 
effectively seal off her areas from the outside world. 4 
'Ihe new near proximity of Jar:an not only frightened the dominions 
108 
but forced the United States Navy to recCXJnize the weakened position it 
held in the Western Pacific, and the Philippines. Instead of a 
potentially hostile power straddling the sea lanes of canmunications 
between Hawaii and the Philippines, a proba.ble hostile power was 
situated amidst those lanes. Japan was a potential opponent that 
possessed not only naval power but the ability to deliver land forces 
with efficiency to areas of hostilities. Even before the outbreak of 
the war, the Navy had been investigating and surveying the German 
islands in preparation for a trans-Pacific crossing of the United 
States Navy should warfare involve American interests in the Western 
Pacific, those interests being the Philippine Islands, as well as Guam. 
Rising tensions over continued racial trouble in california in May, 
1913 pushed the Navy to recommend the strengthening of Naval forces in 
the Philippines, with a further recomnendation that the Anny be 
augmented, just in case Japan did decide to open hostilities. The 
Gennan islands were seen as possible way stations that would allow the 
fleet to refuel enroute to the theater of operations and for the relief 
of the forces supposedly holding out in the Philippines. Naturally, 
using the islands without prior permission would violate German 
territorial integrity if she remained neutral in such a war, or the 
fleet \.\Duld probably incur damage in any attempt to appropriate 
territory in any conflict that involved the Germans. Thus the Navy 
could not look with favor at the Japanese advance and the threat to the 
security of American positions along the route to the Philippines. 5 
Fears about Japanese ambitions after the capture of German 
territory were proven justified with her secret presentation of the "21 
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Derrands" on China in January, 1915. Chinese acceptance of the demands 
would have made her a protectorate of Japan, but the list of demands 
(Japanese control of the military, navy, arsenals and naval bases) was 
made public by the Chinese in order to bring international pressure to 
bear on Japan, especially from the United States. It was the United 
States, in fact, that had played a role in the issuance of the danands. 
Japan professed justification in issuing the demands for it felt that 
American canmercial interests in China were going to be used by the 
Chinese, and the United States Navy, to acquire a long sought for naval 
base in Fukien Province, which was prohibited by the terms of the 1895 
Nan-alienation agreement between Japan and China. China was desirous 
of American naval assistance, in part to thwart such expected Japanese 
parries in China. The pressure exerted by the United States was enough 
to get mcrlification of the danands dealing with Chinese anned forces, 
but the sinking of the Lusitania in May, 1915 served to distract the 
State Department and Japan took advantage of the manent to force China 
to accede to the remaining demands. Later that year Japan, with the 
threat of military intervention, persuaded China to sign additional 
agreements that provided for the ultimate disposition of the Shantung 
Peninsula. Evidence indicates that Japan never had any intention of 
returning the territory to China, using the excuse instead that blood 
had been spilled in the capture of Kiaochou and national honor called 
for the price to be recovered. 6 
This was the situation facing the United States Navy in the years 
1914-1915. Japan had expanded territorially and was threatening to 
swallow more of China; her military was strong, well funded, and in 
llO 
use. Arrerican military strength was neutralized, conservatively 
funded, and un-tested, unless duty in hemispheric tunnoil was counted. 
The Navy did benefit from the war because of the Wilson 
Administration , s suspicion of Germany. A German victory would strip 
away the protection of the Royal Navy, leaving the United States to 
face the Germans alone. Other factors came into play: the continued 
rise of Japan and the post war intentions of Britain. Naval planners 
correctly noted that the ongoing struggle between Germany and Britain 
was based on economics and now Germany had threatened British economic 
well being. Using historical examples, the planners dramatically 
derronstrated that past competitors such as Spain, Holland, France, and 
now Germany, were eventually defeated by the British following 
challenges to her interests globally. An expanded Arrerican canrrercial 
role was a natural consequence of the war, following the decision to 
rerrain neutral. A British defeat of Germany would leave her dominant 
in Europe, and with a tested battle fleet as well as a larger merchant 
fleet. Japan figured in the picture because of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance and her known propensity for sneak attacks. 7 
In August, 1916 Congress finally supported a 





between Germany and Britain. Both combatants had claimed victory but 
in fact Britain had gained a strategic victory for the German navy 
v-.Duld never again venture out for battle. The victory was tempered by 
the tactical defeat suffered by Britain because of the large number of 
capital ships lost by the Royal 
designed to build "a Navy second 
Navy. The 
to none", 
appropriations act was 
which openly challenged 
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British primacy on the world's oceans. The bill was not aimed at 
Britain but rather at the strengthening of the American Navy in case 
Germany managed to effect a complete victory. The Navy had its own 
reasons for pushing for larger naval appropriations, reasons that were 
tied into the lack of a definite policy regarding the eventual 
disposition of the Philippine Islands. Continued failure in acquiring 
a major naval base in the Philippines, in conjunction with the Japanese 
expansion into the Central Pacific, meant that the American territory 
was in clear and present danger. A lack of national policy, 
Presidential direction, or Congressional appropriations meant that the 
Navy had to plan for contingencies without the most important facet of 
international relations, strong direction fran the elected leadership, 
and the status of the Philippines was one of the problems that should 
have received more consideration from the leadership. The urgent need 
to defend the islands was never n-atched by equivalent action on the 
part of the President, the Congress, or fran a mandate of popular 
opinion. Plans for war \Mere required for protection of the territory 
and to implement those plans in emergencies direction fran above was 
needed but so was manpower, a larger naval force, and a major naval 
base in the Far East. Until 1916 none of these had been provided. 8 
The disposition of the Philippines was taken up in the 1916 Jones 
Act that called for greater autonomy for the islands, and provided for 
eventual independence. The Navy's perception of the disposition of the 
islands was to provide protection if possible for them, and called for 
the permanent retention of several naval facilities in the Philippines 
in connection with the proposed independence. If no base was acquired, 
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the Navy recanrrended that the United States not guarantee the integrity 
and safety of the islands frc:m aggression. In this regard, lacking any 
strong direction, the Navy was forced to make its own statement of 
policy: that the mission of the United States Navy in the Far East was 
to protect the Philippines at Ma.nila. Along with Army forces, the 
islands, in time of war, were to hold out for 60-90 days and await the 
arrival of the canbined American naval forces. This was the policy in 
effect at the tirne of the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack. Note that the 
forces held out for almost six months, even with the destruction of 
9 naval assets at Pearl Harbor. 
With the Congressional passage of a large navy bill, a challenge 
from Britain was then experienced. Britain, in a fight for her life 
and facing the German submarine threat, expected that the United States 
WJuld eventually join the war on the side of the Entente. The battle 
to defeat the submarines was taking a toll on the over-extended Royal 
Navy's anti-sutmarine forces. Britain pushed for an increased Arrerican 
building program of smaller ships, that could assist in the hunt for 
sutmarines, but that was just one reason, for if Britain could get the 
United States Navy to use its appropriations for smaller vessels it 
WJuld not be able to finance the building of large capital ships that 
could challenge Britain after the end of the war when American 
conmercial interests would be a powerful ca:npetitor. American navy men 
fought this suggestion, even after the American entry into the war in 
April, 1917. The need for a strong navy in place following the end of 
the war was viewed as more important than assisting Britain in the hunt 
for sutmarines. Since the nation was not at war it made strategic 
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sense to ensure the Navy was able to build up the size of the fleet and 
not succumb to British desires, the decision was more sound during the 
American participation in the war, for the loss of assets in battle 
could interfere with post war planning strategy. 10 
Japanese interests in post war affairs led to an exchange of 
secret notes between Britain, France, Russia, Italy and Japan in 
February, 1917 in which the latter sought to insure the retention of 
her territorial gains in the Pacific after the end of the war and the 
conclusion of a peace treaty. Japan was given affirnative answers in 
regard to that request, partly as a price for use of Japanese cruisers 
in Mediterranean waters. The secret notes between the Allies were not 
made public, nor revealed to the United States. American naval 
planners had already made plans for the eventual disposition of the 
Genuan islands should the United States enter the war, which occurred 
two months later with the declaration of war with Germany. The 
planners answer to the Japanese control of the German islands was to 
of fer Japan a free hand in Northern Asia as a way to divert her path, 
away from the Philippines, as well as remove the threat to the 
trans-Pacific route from Hawaii. As it was most certain that Japan 
would object to being relieved of her war gains it was considered 
important that the United States plead her case most strongly at post 
war peace negotiations. The Department of Navy tried to ensure that 
the State Department was informed about this proposal, but it appears 
that the British may have previously infonred American officials about 
the secret arrangement with Japan, and that it would be impossible to 
break the pranise of the islands to Japan, significantly because as a 
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quid pro quo Britain would retain territory south of the equator 
captured by Imperial forces in 1914. Other parts of the secret 
arrangements retween :mem1::ers of the Entente included Russian control of 
the Bosporus Straits, Italian control of forrrer Austro-Hungarian 
territory, and French control of forrrer Gennan territories. Thus a 
move to renege on the promise to Japan would most certainly have caused 
a schism among the United States and the Entente, threatening any hope 
of unity that Woodrow Wilson needed for his dream of the creation of a 
I.J2ague of N::=ttions, a major plank in his announced "Fourteen Points", 
his post war vision for ensuring peace. One of the points involved the 
issue of secret treaty arrangements, and called for covenants openly 
arrived at, which conflicted with the previous arrangements. 11 
The entry of the war by the United States in April, 1917 did 
little to change the situation in the Pacific as all Germa.n territory 
in the area had been occupied, and what rerrained of Germa.n raiders was 
slowly dwindling in numbers. A majority of the Navy's efforts were in 
the Atlantic, combatting the submarine rrenace and performing convoy 
duty. The British continued to push for the American abandonrrent of 
capital ship construction and to increase the number of smaller escort 
vessels, but again the pressure failed to achieve its goal, in part 
recause there was a fear of American naval planners that a def eat of 
Germany, with her fleet intact, meant a division of those fleet units 
among the victor's with Britain getting the lions share, who could 
justifiable argue that the Royal Navy had suffered the heaviest burden 
and the highest losses. An already large Royal N::=tvy was anticipated to 
increase its ratio size over the United States Navy. Britain had a 
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bountiful amount of bases around the world, and had rranaged to control 
large amounts of fuel supplies. Thus there was no advantage in an 
American decision to cut back on the construction of capital ships. 12 
The opening of the post-war peace conference at Versailles found 
the European participants in a vindicative mood towards Gerrrany, 
forcing Wilson to compromise on sane issues dealing with the Far E:l.st 
in order to gain Allied support for the League of Nations. The 
question of the Pacific Islands was discussed but after a brief 
exchange of views Japan was not forced to give them up, rather the 
American delegation, in conjunction with Jan Smuts of South Africa, 
worked out an arrangement for the territories. The islands were set up 
as mandates with Japan being the mandatory power. The Wilson-proposed 
League of Nations would be the governing body for the eventual 
disposition of the territories, but until that decision was rrade the 
mandatory power was to ensure the preparation of the territory for 
independence. Not all parties 'Mere pleased with this arrangement. 
Japan felt the United States had robbed her of the war gains by not 
permitting the perrranent occupation of the islands, while the United 
States Navy had hoped for another power to occupy the islands, or for 
the permanent neutralization of the islands. Japan had reason for 
anger at the United States, for in all of her previous wars, Western 
po'Mers had intervened to deprive Japan of territory gained at the 
expense of the vanquished. The 1895 Tripartite Intervention prevented 
the retention of Port Arthur, the 1905 Portsmouth Treaty prevented the 
cession of the entire island of Sakhalin, and now the United States was 
trying to deprive Japan of the islands. Additionally, as part of the 
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terms of the mandate the islands could neither be fortified nor 
offensive materiel put in place. The Jap:i.nese were upset about this 
restriction because it applied to the islands captured during the war 
by Japan, but did not apply to the Philippines, Guam, or pre-1914 
British islands, all in near proxiillity of Japanese territory. The 
question of racism or offensive plans against Jap:i.n were not the cause 
of the restrictions, rather the need to insure that Japan would not use 
the islands as offensive staging grounds against the Philippines, or 
against the exµ::>sed Central Pacific route from Hawaii to the 
Philippines. Japan saw it as just another attempt by the western white 
µ:>~rs to corral Japan and contain her in the over-µ::>pulated home 
. 1 nd 13 lS a S. 
War planning strategy for the Western Pacific was realistically 
b:tsed on a hard fight across the Pacific. After the Japanese 
occupation of the Pacific islands none of the plans changed in regard 
to the strategy and tactics of the trans-Pacific trek. It was the end 
of the trek that now concerned American planners, for Germany had had 
no ground forces to speak of in the islands, while the heme land was a 
continent away. Japanese territory was now within visual sight of 
American territory. The Japanese held island of Rota was about sixty 
miles frcm Guam, and only 200 miles separated the Philippines frcm 
Taiwan. The shortened lines of corrmunication gave Japan a nurrerical 
advantage over the United States in terms of arrred forces and naval 
units, while the United States envisioned a period of 60-90 days before 
the fleet could arrive in the Western Pacific. In wartime the fleet 
was scheduled to arrive in Philippine waters with the expectation that 
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the American forces in Manila would have been able to hold out, so as 
to be able to provide the fleet support facilities as well as ensure 
the ability to contest any occupation. To support the Navy it was 
expected Congress would approve another large naval appropriations bill 
designed to overcane the ratio advantage enjoyed by Japan, and the the 
base advantage held by Britain. Such legislation was drafted in late 
1918, containing provisions that established a greater role for naval 
aviation, as far-sighted naval thinkers had envisioned a Japanese 
invasion in the Philippines being repelled by bomber aircraft. 
Subnarines were also viewed as an acceptable method of providing 
defensive support to exposed positions. Sane funding was provided for 
the building of larger naval facilities in Guam and Manila Bay, but the 
amount would never be enough to sufficiently construct what was needed, 
a truly major Far East naval base. It was this type of funding that 
Jar::an feared, for the restrictions on the rrandates specifically forbade 
this kind of activity, but the United States and Britain were free to 
build up their pre-war territories. American naval paranoia about 
Jar::anese intentions in the mandates were never proved unjustified until 
after V\brld War II. From the manent Jar::an took possession of the 
islands in 1914 the possibility of the positions being transformed into 
little Gibraltars was constantly on the mind of naval planners. Those 
planners feared the construction of subnarine bases, air bases, major 
facilities for fleet surface units and comuunications facilities. 
Constant attempts at surveys, overt and surreptitious, only made the 
planners more and more suspicious because it could never be definitely 
proved that Japan had not fortified the islands. Interrogation of 
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senior Japanese officials after 1945 proved the fears of such activity 
for the years 1914-1922 were unjustified. Japan had not attempted to 
fortify the islands until after 1935, with her withdrawal from the 
League of Nations. The interrogation brought out the fact the such 
activity faced the same challenges that the Americans did in fortifying 
the Philippines and Guam. The tremendous amount of funds needed to 
build such facilities was never appropriated by the legislative bodies 
of either country, and thus each naval service had to do the best it 
could with limited assets. Japan faced additional problems in the 
islands, for the positions were almost all hard lava or coral rock. 
Dredging was expensive and time consuming. After 193 5, the Japanese 
sirrply began to take advantage of the natural terrain to build almost 
impregnable positions. That was what awaited the United States in 
1944. 14 
END OF THE DREAM FOR THE FAR EAST BASE, 1919-1922 
The years between 1919 (the Versailles Conference) and 1921 (the 
Washington Conference) were peaceful in so far as the Pacific 
territories were concerned. Civil war raged in Russia, extending to 
Siberia, and threatened to spill over the border into China. A 
decision was made in 1918 by the najor powers (Britain, France, Japan 
and the United States) to intervene in the civil war. The attempt 
proved to be inconclusive but it left Japan entrenched in Russian 
territory for several years. American participation in the 
intervention had in part been intended to forestall such a Japanese 
occupation of Russian territory. Relations between the two nations 
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W2re forrral at best, and anirrosity was the rule. Japa.nese officials 
acted in what was considered an arrogant manner and did their best to 
ensure that cooperation was difficult. The installation of a puppet 
government in the Siberian break-away state of the Far East Republic 
did little to calm fears of Japa.nese expansion in Asia. 15 
It was in this atrnosphere that the Congress of the United States 
considered the large naval bill desired by the Navy, to which Japa.n's 
Diet, pressured by her own navy, responded with legislation for a long 
sought after 11 8-8 11 program. Designed to achieve local superiority over 
the u. S. Navy in the Western Pacific, the pro:rram called for the 
building of three squadrons with forty-eight battleships and 
b3.ttlecruisers. These two bills were seen as the start of another 
naval race that could plunge the world into a second world war. 
Woodrow Wilson had envisioned using the threat of a larger Am2rican 
naval force to encourage the allies to support the League of Nations 
proposal. His goal was either the creation of the league, or the 
creation of an American navy second to none. The British and Japa.nese 
v.Duld have to rratch such an increase because each could reasonably see 
such a larger American navy as destined to threaten their post war 
ambitions. 
It was this determination to gain parity that threatened the peace 
just signed. Calls for moderation grew and peace rroverrents pressed for 
a halt to naval races. Eventually the calls for such a halt led to a 
joint resolution by Senator Borah (Idaho) in December, 1920 calling for 
a conference that would stop the race. Pressure grew on the American 
leadership, while in Britain calls increased for such a conference. 
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The result was an invitation by Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes 
to assemble interested naval pc:wers in Washington D.C. in November, 
1921. Eventually Britain and Japan decided to attend, with each 
naturally having its own agenda to proITOte, and the scope of the 
conference was expanded to deal with issues other than naval programs. 
The Far East and the unsettled China picture were also to be discussed, 
including the American (and canadian) hope for the abandonment of the 
Anglo-Jap:mese Alliance. Australia and New Zealand expressed the view 
to the British that Arrerican friendship was desired over Japanese 
support. Britain wanted to retain its nllffi2rical advantage over the 
United States, while Japan was desirous of receiving equal treatment as 
a great power, and wanted a halt to the construction of fortifications 
in the Philippines, Guam, Hong Kong, Singapore and British New Guinea. 
The United States Navy provided its own service agenda, calling for no 
limitation of fortifications construction in the Far East and the 
retention of the numerical naval advantage over Japan. Hughes shocked 
the conference on the first day (12 "November, 1921) by announcing that 
the United States was willing to scrap entire building programs, 
destroy existing vessels and agree to a naval shipbuilding holiday. 
The proposals included the curtailment of the American 1916 bill and a 
reduction in the Japanese 118-8 11 bill, as well as British programs. 
This was totally unexpected by the participants at the conference, who 
had no real desire to give up existing advantages. Hughes had counted 
on world opinion to influence home governments into accepting the 
program put forward. By the end of the conference (February, 1922) the 
resulting naval limitation treaty seemed to have stopped the naval 
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race, but naval leaders in Japan, the United States and Britain were 
left with a bitter taste. Japan was forced to accept a lesser 
nurrerical fleet percentage (the 5-5-3 concept) which was designed to 
give her only superiority in hane waters. In laymen's terms 5-5-3 
rreant that for every 500,000 tons of capital ships possessed by the 
United States and Britain the Japanese would be allowed 300,000 tons. 
In exchange for accepting the lower percentage Japan was able to get 
inserted into the treaty a specific clause (Article 19) that prohibited 
any further fortification of the territories of the Philippines, Guam, 
Hong Kong, and her own island territories captured from the Gennans. 
The United States Navy had attempted from the beginning to ensure that 
such a proposal would never make it into the final draft of the treaty, 
as it 'M:>uld pennanentl y kil 1 any opportunities for the United States to 
effectively defend the Philippines and the Western Pacific. The 
acceptance of this article along with the 5-5-3 ratio meant t.11at the 
United States possessed "zero" offensive and negligible defensive 
capabilities in the Far East. Japan would have all the advantages, in 
tenns of local superiority, shorter lines of canmunications, the 
ability to fortify its positions before the United States could 
effectively respond to threats and the ability to deliver its forces in 
an unopposed fashion. 
The United States Navy had hoped for a much more favorable treaty, 
but protests regarding "unacceptable" proposals failed to persuade 
American negotiators not to compromise too much. Forced to publicly 
accept the treaty, direction from above, though vague, gave the "order" 
that the Washington Conference Treaty on Naval Limitations was 
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acceptable by all naval planners. It was not acceptable to all in the 
United States Navy, but the treaty was nON national policy, and all 
that remained was to abide by it. That rreant the end of the dream of a 
naval base in the Western Pacific. Other results fran the conference 
dealt with the recognition of China's precarious stability, leading to 
the signing of the Four Power and Nine Power Treaties providing for the 
recognition of the status quo in Asia and the return of the Shantung 
Peninsula to China, the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 16 
From the start naval rren had never given up hope of being able to 
defend American interests in the Far East. Limited assets prevented a 
much stronger program of defense. Whether from a lack of direction, or 
a lack of funds, a service without either cannot carry out its 
missions. The Navy's mission in the Far East, after 1898, was to 
protect American interests. The most important American interests were 
the Philippines but the leadership of the nation could never quite come 
to terms with the needs for defending the islands. Whether it was 
financial austerity, political patronage, or oversight, the civilian 
leadership of the United States would not truly support the 
establishment of a major Far East facility for the navy until 1947, 
ironically at Subic Bay. The Navy's role was, and still is, not to 
create a policy but rather to defend or protect such interests that 
policy may call for, and usually it is the job of the leadership to 
determine the interests. The Navy rightly surmised that the nation 
would be in turmoil over any threat to the Philippines, it just could 
never convince the electorate of a need for a strong and stable 
defense. The was no mischievous reason for the desire to gain a base 
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in the Philippines, rather the need to protect the islands and the 
Western Pacific required, in the Navy's view, the facilities to service 
and repair fleet assets. Without a strong base in the Western Pacific, 
the fleet would have to live with a very reduced canl::e.t readiness upon 
arriving in the region. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy during the Wilson Administration understood only too well the 
handicap and "the technical problems of sea warfare." During his 
tenure as President of the United States Roosevelt "advised his cabinet 
that a fleet loses about ten percent of its efficiency for every 
thousand miles it steams away fran its hane base." The distance from 
San Pedro, california, home base of the fleet in 1941, to the 
Philippines is over 7,000 nautical miles, thus a fleet deploying to the 
Western Pacific in war time ~uld, in theory, arrive there at a combat 
readiness of less than 50%, and that only if it did not suffer any 
battle damage enroute. That appeared to be an unlikely event as the 
Japanese control of the Gernan islands prevented an unchallenged 
sortie. Such a scenario meant that the islands ~uld be lost. A loss 
of the islands to invaders was seen as damaging to the international 
position and national interests of the nation and efforts by the 
services, while occasionally self-serving, were designed to protect the 
. . d . t 17 position an interes s. 
Thaddeus D. Tuleja surrmed up the problem faced by the Navy in 
fulfilling national security requirements by noting that in 1919 
Assistant Secretary Roosevelt: 
asserted in a letter to the Secretary of State [Robert 
Iansing] that the Deparbnent of State ought to know what its 
policies might cost, and the Navy ought to know what it might 
be called upon to uphold by force. The coordination of 
strategic and political considerations, he conclude, could 
be achieved through a Joint Plan JVJaking Body. The letter, 
of course, was drafted by naval strategist, and it is par-
ticularly significant, in view of what was to cane later 
in the feeble unfolding of our Far Eastern policy, that 
they W2re greatly concerned whether or not they could carry 
a naval war into Asian waters ... The formulation of a 
concise naval policy was often the subject of a frustrating 
debate within the naval service, especially when the Govern-
ment itself vacillated in the pursuit of its o.vn national 
aspirations ••. But a vigorous naval policy, as viewed 
through the eyes of [planners], was the victim of more than 
government idealism and Congressional thrift. The strange 
ferment ... was concocted of isolationism, naval limitations . 
. • peace societies ..• and these forces working together 
seemed to make permanent the eclispe of Arrerican sea power 
[in the Western Pacific]. 
124 
The American naval nightmare started when the policies of the nation 
and its vital interests W2re never clearly defined but the military was 
expected to react to threats involving those undefined interests. The 
defense of the Western Pacific was clearly such an exarnple. 18 
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